Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior? by J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We thank Charles Calomiris, Amit Khandelwal, Ray Fisman, Matthew Gentzkow, Justin McCrary,
Tom Miles, Daniel Paravisini, Doug Staiger, and Toni Whited for their comments and suggestions,
as well as seminar participants at Columbia Business School, Northwestern Law School, Syracuse
University, the American Law and Economics Meetings, the Canadian Law and Economics Meetings,
and the NBER Working Group on the Economics of Crime. Reid Aronson, Erik Johnson, Rembrand
Koning, Nicholas Lee, Elias Walsh, Oliver Welch, and Julia Zhou provided excellent research assistance.
JJ Prescott gratefully acknowledges the John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics at University of
Michigan Law School for financial support for this project. Jonah Rockoff would like to thank the
Paul Milstein Center for Real Estate at Columbia Business School for research support. The views
expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by J.J. Prescott and Jonah E. Rockoff. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?
J.J. Prescott and Jonah E. Rockoff




In recent decades, sex offenders have been the targets of some of the most far-reaching and novel crime
legislation in the U.S. Two key innovations have been registration and notification laws which, respectively,
require that convicted sex offenders provide valid contact information to law enforcement authorities,
and that information on sex offenders be made public. Using detailed information on the timing and
scope of changes in state law, we study how registration and notification affect the frequency of sex
offenses and the incidence of offenses across victims, and check for any change in police response
to reported crimes. We find evidence that registration reduces the frequency of sex offenses by providing
law enforcement with information on local sex offenders. As we predict from a simple model of criminal
behavior, this decrease in crime is concentrated among "local" victims (e.g., friends, acquaintances,
neighbors), while there is little evidence of a decrease in crimes against strangers. We also find evidence
that community notification deters crime, but in a way unanticipated by legislators. Our results correspond
with a model in which community notification deters first-time sex offenses, but increases recidivism
by registered offenders due to a change in the relative utility of legal and illegal behavior. This finding
is consistent with work by criminologists suggesting that notification may increase recidivism by imposing
social and financial costs on registered sex offenders and making non-criminal activity relatively less
attractive. We regard this latter finding as potentially important, given that the purpose of community
notification is to reduce recidivism.
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Criminal recidivism poses a serious risk to public safety.  According to a recent Bureau 
of Justice Statistics study, over two-thirds of released inmates will return to prison within a few 
years, often for committing serious offenses (BJS (2002)).  National Corrections Reporting 
Program data show that approximately 40 percent of all criminals sent to prison in the U.S. over 
the last twenty years had already been convicted of a felony.  Recently, victims’ advocates and 
others have argued that persons convicted of sex offenses are highly likely to “same crime” 
recidivate (Langan et al. (2003)).  Although criminal behavior declines steeply with age after the 
early twenties for most types of crime, the decline for sex offenses appears to be more gradual 
(Hanson (2002)).  Partly for these reasons, and because of a number of high-profile crimes in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, sex offenders have become the focus of considerable legislation and 
public spending aimed at reducing recidivism. 
  In the 1990s, two sets of laws targeting sex offenders emerged across the United States.  
A federal mandate in 1994 (the Jacob Wetterling Act, named after the victim of a crime in 
Minnesota) required that states create registries of sex offenders for use by law enforcement.  
Another federal mandate in 1996 (Megan’s Law, named after a victim in New Jersey, Megan 
Kanka) required that states provide public notification of the location of sex offenders to local 
residents or other “at risk” groups.  The basic motivations for registration and notification were, 
respectively, to aid law enforcement in supervising and apprehending sex offenders who may 
recidivate and to help local households protect themselves through monitoring and avoiding 
offenders in their neighborhoods.  However, despite the similar motivations of state legislatures, 
there was considerable variation in the timing with which states passed these laws, and states 
were given considerable discretion concerning many important details of this legislation. 
  Despite the proliferation of sex offender registration and notification laws, it is unclear 
whether they have been successful in reducing crime by sex offenders, or whether they have 
achieved other goals (e.g., increasing the probability of capture).  It is also unknown whether sex 
offenders respond (or are able to respond) to these laws in other ways (e.g., adjusting how they 
select their victims).  The answers to these questions are important not only for evaluating the   2
costs and benefits of registration and notification laws, but also for understanding how an 
important group of convicted criminals responds to changes in legal sanctions.
1 
The first studies that sought to measure the impact of registration and notification laws 
(Schram and Milloy (1995) and Adkins et al. (2000)) compared recidivism rates of offenders in 
Iowa and Washington State released just before and just after registration and notification laws 
became effective.
2  While neither study found a statistically significant difference in future 
arrests for sex offenses between these two arguably comparable groups, both studies relied on 
small samples of offenders.  More recent studies have examined the relationship between the 
timing of laws’ passage and changes in the annual frequency of sex offenses across states using 
data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (Walker et al. (2005), Shao and Li (2006), and Agan 
(2007)).  Taken together, these studies find little evidence that these laws had a significant 
impact on sex offenses.
3 
While we also use the timing of changes in state laws to study the impact of those laws 
on criminal behavior, we are able to offer new evidence on a number of different questions 
because our analysis differs significantly from earlier work in both the data we use and the 
methodology we employ.  First, we conducted extensive research into the sex offender 
legislation of various states, and found that earlier studies had in many cases used incorrect legal 
dates or incorrectly described the nature of these laws.  Understanding the timing and scope of 
this body of law is not an easy task, partially because sex offender laws have changed over time 
due to legislative amendments and judicial decisions.
4  We also take advantage of information on 
the exact dates when laws became effective by using monthly data and allowing for variation in 
crime frequency within years, in contrast to the earlier work using annual data. 
                                                 
1 Empirical work provides some support for the claim that criminals in general react to changes in expected 
punishment (e.g., Levitt (1998), Kessler and Levitt (1999), Nagin (1998)).  However, it is unclear whether this is 
true for all types of individuals (see McCrary and Lee (2005) on juvenile offenders), and whether these results 
extend to sex offenders in particular is unknown (see Bachman et al. (1992)).   
2 Unlike many other states, registration and notification laws in Washington and Iowa were passed at the same time. 
3 Only Shao and Li (2006) report any evidence that offender registration laws caused a statistically significant 
reduction in sex offenses.  However, their findings are sensitive to empirical specification and they group 
registration and notification laws together as a single treatment.  Agan (2007) offers some evidence that posting sex 
offender information on the internet reduced the number of arrests for sex offenses, but her results are similarly 
sensitive and open to alternative interpretations. 
4 We describe the history of sex offender registration and notification laws in detail in Section 2 and provide basic 
information on these enactments in the Appendix.   3
Second, unlike existing work, our analysis distinguishes between sex offender 
registration and notification laws.  Notification laws require the dissemination of information 
about sex offenders (e.g., criminal history, physical description, home address, and other 
information).  Registration laws, in contrast, require that sex offenders register their residential 
locations with a public authority (usually local police), but this information is otherwise kept 
confidential.  While registration requirements were intended solely to help law enforcement track 
and apprehend recidivist offenders, notification laws aimed both at reducing crime through 
greater public awareness and increasing the likelihood of capture conditional on the commission 
of a crime (Prentky (1996), Pawson (2002), Levenson and D’Amora (2007)).  We also 
differentiate among the various features of different notification laws, e.g., access to paper 
registry, internet access to information, or proactive community notification.
5   
  Third, we make a methodological contribution to the sex offender and recidivism 
literatures by using variation in the number of offenders actually registered with authorities to 
separately identify the various ways in which registration and notification may influence criminal 
behavior and police responsiveness.  As a result, we are able to test several specific hypotheses 
regarding the laws’ impacts on criminal behavior.  For example, notification laws are aimed at 
protecting the public against recidivists, but may also have a separate deterrent effect for 
potential sex offenders who have not yet been convicted.  The institution of a notification law 
raises the expected punishment to potential first-time sex offenders because their crimes and 
personal information will be made public upon release if they are caught and convicted.  This 
effect should be invariant to the number of offenders actually registered.  In contrast, the effect 
of registration on recidivism should be stronger when the registry contains information on a 
larger number of sex offenders. 
Last, but not least, we examine the effects of these laws on the relationship mix between 
offenders and victims in addition to the overall frequency of reported sex offenses.  Neither 
registration nor notification were intended to affect the “incidence” of sex offenses across 
different types of victims, but some observers have suspected that notification laws might simply 
displace crime (see Prentky (1996), Filler (2001)) by changing the population of victims targeted 
                                                 
5 Agan (2007) examines registration and the availability of information via the internet, but this is the only instance 
that we are aware of in which existing work on sex offender laws makes a distinction between registration and 
notification.   4
by sex offenders.  For example, if notification laws cause offenders to seek victims outside of 
their neighborhoods, one might expect to see little overall reduction in crime, but a significant 
change in the relationships between victims and offenders.  We also study changes in the 
probability that an arrest is made given a reported sex offense, or that the offense report is 
“cleared exceptionally” because the victim refused to cooperate or the prosecution declined to 
pursue the case.  This last piece of our analysis serves as a robustness check and aids the 
interpretation of our results on crime frequency. 
  We find evidence that sex offender registration and notification laws decreased the total 
frequency of sex offenses in the states we examine.  The registration of released sex offenders 
alone is associated with a significant decrease in the frequency of crime.  This is in line with 
predictions from a simple model of criminal behavior in which the provision of information on 
registered offenders to local authorities increases monitoring and the expected punishment for 
recidivism.  Moreover, as predicted by the model, the drop in the overall frequency of reported 
sex offenses associated with registration is due primarily to reductions in attacks against “local” 
victims who are known to an offender (i.e., a family member, friend, acquaintance, or neighbor).  
Importantly, sex offenses by strangers appear unaffected by registration, indicating little or no 
substitution of crimes from local to more distant victims.   
  In addition, we find that the creation of a community notification law (regardless of the 
number of registered offenders) is associated with a reduction in the overall frequency of sex 
offenses.  One potential explanation for this effect, again consistent with our model, is that 
notification raises the expected punishment for future offenders.  Importantly, we find no 
evidence that notification laws (as opposed to registration laws) reduced crime by lowering 
recidivism.  While notification is associated with a decrease in crime, this estimated effect is 
actually weaker when a large number of offenders are on the registry.  This finding is potentially 
consistent with a number of explanations.  But, as we show below, the evidence on balance 
supports the existence of a significant “relative utility” effect, in which convicted sex offenders 
become more likely to commit crime when their information is made public because the 
associated psychological, social, or financial costs make crime more attractive. 
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we provide a description of the 
variation in the timing and scope of states’ registration and notification laws.  Section 3 lays out   5
the potential effects of registration and notification using a simple model of criminal behavior 
and presents our basic empirical methodology.  In Section 4, we describe our data, and we 
explain our empirical approach in Section 5.  We present our main results in Section 6 and a 
series of robustness checks in Section 7.  Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  The Evolution of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws   
  To characterize the sex offender registration and notification laws properly for the 
empirical work below, we conducted legal research into the evolution of these laws in states 
covered by the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) in the 1990s, the data used in 
our analysis below.  We constructed a detailed legal timeline for each state, relying principally 
on paper legislative sources, legal databases containing statutory language and judicial opinions, 
news releases and stories, and conversations and email communications with state employees.  
We catalogued enactment dates, effective dates, and compliance dates for each legal change, and 
verified, where possible, that such changes took place in reality, as opposed to simply on paper.  
We cross-checked our research with other sources containing compilations of sex offender laws 
and resolved all conflicts.  Finally, we recorded the precise content of these legal changes, which 
is particularly necessary with sex offender notification laws because they differ across states on 
various dimensions. 
  Determining the timing with which sex offender registration and notification laws 
became effective proved to be a difficult task.  Table 1 illustrates this by showing the dates used 
by Shao and Li (2006), Agan (2007), and Walker et al. (2005) in their analyses of the impact of 
registries on crime rates, in addition to our own legal analysis.
6  Comparisons of these dates 
across research studies show a fairly low rate of agreement.  There are only 15 states for which 
all studies agreed on the exact date, and only 16 for which all dates fell within the same calendar 
year.  For example, consider the state of Utah, for which none of the four studies agree on the 
                                                 
6 Shao and Li (2007) and Walker et al. (2005) are more liberal in how they define a “registration” law, and, as 
practical matter, appear to treat registration and notification as the same thing.  Shao and Li refer to laws that include 
notification provisions as well registration laws.  Walker et al. state explicitly that they examine both “registration 
and notification” laws, but do not distinguish between the two in their empirical work.  Agan (2007), on the other 
hand, recognizes the distinction with respect to internet availability of registry information, but nevertheless does not 
include or consider other kinds of notification.  This can lead to questionable coding as well as interpretation 
problems.  For example, Iowa enacted registration and a limited form of public access at the same time, and Agan’s 
work attributes any change entirely to the registration law.   6
effective registry date.  We place this moment on March 30, 1983, when Utah’s first generally 
applicable sex offender registry became effective.  Shao and Li use May 19, 1987, a date we 
cannot locate in legislative history, but which is quite close to the enactment (as opposed to 
effective) date of a 1987 law that re-codified and amended the registration law then in place.  
Agan uses July 1, 1984, which likely refers to a 1984 law that also amended the original 1983 
enactment, but the effective date for that law was February 16, 1984.  Walker et al. use the year 
1996, the year that Utah passed a notification law granting public access to the registry 
information. 
  We divide the legal changes we study into four categories: registration, public access, 
internet availability, and active notification.  Registration laws are invariably the first strategy 
states employ to protect against sex offender recidivism.  These laws require that sex offenders 
(always at least the violent and habitual ones) provide state authorities with information on their 
demographics (e.g., age, race, distinguishing features) and location (e.g., home, work, or school 
address), as well as criminal history, upon release from custody or probation.  Until notification 
laws were enacted, this information was held confidential by law enforcement.  In theory, 
registration laws may lower sex offense rates through increased police surveillance or by 
reducing the expected payoff of committing a new sex offense via increased probability of 
punishment.  Registration can make sex offenses easier to solve because a set of likely offenders 
will have already been identified, and authorities will know where to locate (and apprehend) that 
set of offenders. 
  The remaining three categories of laws – public access, internet availability, and active 
notification – are designed to make information about offenders (identity and location) available 
to the public, rather than to assist police directly.  As we explain in more detail below, the public 
can, in theory, reduce sex offender recidivism by avoiding convicted offenders (reducing the 
number of potential target victims) or though “community policing” (e.g., reporting suspicious 
behavior).  Most states began this process by providing public access to their registration 
databases, but varied in the restrictions they placed on access to this information.  Some states 
(e.g., Idaho) only allowed the public to make information requests in writing or about specific 
suspected persons.  Others made information available about all sex offenders in the area and 
allowed them to be openly inspected at police departments or other government agencies (e.g.,   7
Michigan).  Both approaches to public access assume that potential victims or witnesses will 
make use of these opportunities despite their nontrivial travel and time costs.  
  Over time, restrictive states loosened their access restrictions, and all states eventually 
moved registration information onto the internet to minimize transactions costs and maximize 
information dissemination.  Sex offender “web registries” allow the public to search for 
offenders using a suspected individual’s information (e.g., a name or alias) or by entering a 
specific address into a search algorithm to determine whether registered offenders live nearby.   
Many states also implemented some form of “active notification” of individuals likely to be 
victimized.  Active notification laws require that state officials do more than simply release 
information to someone who inquires.  Examples include announcing the release or residential 
move of a sex offender through a notice placed in a newspaper, by personal visits or letters to 
neighbors, former victims, or others likely to have direct contact with the offender, and opt-in 
provisions, which allow former victims or members of the public to request notification if a 
certain sex offender or one satisfying certain conditions is released or moves.  Both of these 
developments were designed to reduce the information costs for potential victims.
7 
  Figure 1a shows the timing of adoption of registration, public access, internet availability, 
and active notification for each NIBRS state (see also Appendix Table 1), as well as the year in 
which agencies from each state began reporting to NIBRS.  While a similar evolution of sex 
offender laws from confidential registries to searchable internet sites and active notification 
occurred across all states, there is significant variation in the timing of the passage of these laws.  
For example, Idaho began registration and (limited) public access simultaneously in 1993, but 
did not have an internet registry live until 2001 and did not have community notification until 
2003.  Texas, in contrast, began registration in 1991, started both public access and community 
notification in 1995, and launched an internet site in 1999.  This type of variation provides the 
basis for our identification strategy.   
Although typically a concern in studies that use variation in the timing of state laws to 
identify their causal effects, endogeneity is unlikely to be a problem in this context for two 
                                                 
7 Michigan provides an example of a fairly typical sex offender law “timeline.”  Michigan passed its first sex 
offender registration law in July 1994 (effective October 1995), enacted its first public access law in January 1997 
(effective April 1997), went online with its sex offender information in February 1999, and finally enacted an active 
notification requirement in March 2006 (effective January 2007).   8
reasons.  First, unlike criminal law in general, where rising crime rates might lead to increases in 
penalties or police spending, many state sex offender laws were passed quickly, in response to 
one or two well-publicized and usually gruesome incidents and not to a rising trend in sex 
offenses.  Indeed, many sex offender laws are named after the victim in the case that sparked the 
legislative effort, and there is little evidence to suggest that legislative actions were motivated by 
rising aggregate trends in sex offenses.  Sex offense rates (like other violent crime rates) actually 
declined over the period in which most of these laws were passed.  Second, two federal laws 
passed in 1994 and 1996 (motivated at least in part by specific crimes against individual children 
in Minnesota and New Jersey) mandated that states pass registration and notification laws.  
These federal laws left states with discretion as to substance and timing, but had minimum 
requirements and did impose deadlines.  Finally, the timing of passage was also partly dictated 
by the pre-existing legislative schedule (e.g., Kentucky, North Dakota and Texas have 
legislatures that meet only once every two years) rather than by changing sex offense trends. 
We also collected information on the retroactivity of the registration and notification laws 
of the states in our sample.  Retroactivity provisions specify which offenders are covered by the 
laws in light of the timing of their conviction or their release from custody.  For example, 
Massachusetts’ first registration law was not effective until October 1, 1996, but anyone 
convicted on or after August 1, 1981, of a qualifying sex offense was nonetheless required to 
register.  As a result, in October 1996, Massachusetts already had fifteen years’ worth of released 
sex offenders who were required to be registered.
8  Michigan, on the other hand, made its sex 
offender laws prospective.  Michigan’s first registration law became effective on October 1, 
1995, but it only required registration of individuals “convicted or released” on or after October 
1, 1995.  As a result, when the law became effective, Michigan’s registry was empty.
9  We use 
the size of the sex offender registry as an additional source of variation by which to identify the 
causal effect of sex offender registration laws, and, with respect to notification laws, to 
                                                 
8 Indeed, close to 8,000 offenders were already registered when the Massachusetts registry became effective in 
October, 1996 (Boston Globe (1996a, 1996b)).  The total number of offenders estimated by the Massachusetts 
Department of Public Safety to be required to register was 10,000. 
9 Although we do not have data from the start of the Michigan registry, we have good historical data on registrations 
in North Carolina and Kentucky since the inception of their laws.  Neither of these states’ laws applied retroactively, 
and, as we would expect, their registries started from almost nothing and grew gradually (and roughly linearly) over 
time.  See Appendix Figure 1.   9
separately identify deterrence of all potential offenders and “incapacitation” (by public 
awareness) of recidivists, as we explain more fully below.
10 
 
3.  Conceptual Model and Empirical Framework 
  We consider the potential effects of registration and notification on crime through a 
simple model of behavior wherein individuals weigh the benefits and costs of crime commission.  
Criminal offenses committed by individual i (Oi) are governed by the probability of punishment 
(pi), the punishment he faces if convicted (fi), and the utility he receives from committing crime, 
relative to other legal behaviors (ui).
11  We add a subscript j for each potential victim, and a term 
cj that reflects the cost to offender i of targeting victim j.  Sex offenses require victims, and the 
laws we consider were specifically intended to make it difficult for offenders to victimize people 
in their vicinity – neighbors, acquaintances, and friends.  By assumption, offenses are increasing 
in the relative utility of commission, and decreasing in the cost of targeting a victim, the 
probability of punishment, and the severity of punishment.  For simplicity, we assume that 
punishment and the relative utility of criminal behavior are invariant across victims. 
Oij = Oij (cij, pij, fi, ui)                   (1) 
  Equation 1 suggests that registration and notification laws are likely to influence the 
number of offenses through several specific channels.  First, registration may increase the ability 
of police to monitor and apprehend registered sex offenders (RSOs), meaning pij would rise for 
RSOs and particularly so in the case of local victims.  Indirectly, this feature of registration may 
also affect forward-looking, unregistered individuals, for whom the punishment (fi) now includes 
a higher future probability of detection.
12  However, so long as registry information remains 
                                                 
10 The choice whether to make a sex offender law retroactive is also unlikely to be endogenous to crime rates.  
Under certain conditions, criminal laws with retroactive features can violate the U.S. and state constitutions.  The 
decision of whether to make a law retroactive in any particular state turned in significant part on governing judicial 
opinions in the state. 
11 This model follows the structure of Becker (1968).  The utility term should be considered an analog to Becker’s 
concept of the individual’s “willingness to commit an illegal act.” 
12 It has been suggested to us that the registry might also lower the probability of punishment (p) for first-time 
offenders if police must shift significant resources towards monitoring registered offenders.  This is theoretically 
possible and though we do not find evidence for this in our analysis we cannot determine whether this occurs.   10
confidential, it seems unlikely that it would alter the cost to targeting victims or the utility of 
crime commission. 
 Notification—either  via  public  access to registry information, an internet registry, or 
active community notification—may further affect criminal behavior.  First, the punishment for 
sex offenses now includes public airing of personal information and one’s criminal history.  This 
publicity has been shown to have negative consequences for RSOs along several dimensions, 
including loss of employment, housing or social ties, harassment from neighbors, and 
psychological costs such as increased stress, loneliness, and depression (see Zevitz and Farkas 
(2000a), Tewksbury (2005), and Levenson and Cotter (2005)).  Thus, for individuals other than 
RSOs, fi would be higher.
13   
  In contrast, RSOs would already face the costs associated with notification, so 
committing another offense only has the effect of prolonging their presence on the registry.  
However, this may exert a relatively small influence on their behavior given that most RSOs face 
an extended registration period (the federal requirement is 10 years, but a number of states have 
lifetime registration for some or all types of offenses).  Moreover, some researchers have 
proposed that the negative consequences of notification may cause RSOs to commit more crime 
(Freeman-Longo (1996), Prentky (1996), Winick (1998), Presser and Gunnison (1999), Edwards 
and Hensley (2001)).  In the context of our model, punishment (fi ) would stay constant for RSOs 
(or perhaps rise slightly), while the relative utility of criminal behavior (ui) would rise.
14  
  In addition, by allowing local residents, friends, and acquaintances to identify and avoid 
registered offenders, notification may increase the costs of targeting this subset of potential 
victims.  Indeed, a major motivation for the passage of Megan’s Law was the presumption that 
Megan Kanka would have avoided her fate had her parents been notified of her eventual 
                                                 
13 We believe this is, in all likelihood, correct. However, we note an argument made by Teichman (2005) that the 
imposition of non-legal punishments for sex offenses could lead to lower expected punishment levels.  Non-legal 
punishments cause fewer offenders to be willing to plead guilty to sex offenses and allow them to commit credibly 
to go to trial.  Prosecutors with limited resources—who previously pled out most sex offenses— may optimally 
respond by taking a few cases to trial and accepting many pleas for other, less serious offenses.  
14 Although we conceive of these burdens on offenders as raising the relative utility of criminal behavior, one could 
also think of them as lowering punishment levels because they make life in prison seem relatively more attractive 
than life on the outside.  Both of these effects would increase offenses committed by registered sex offenders.  We 
thank David Autor for this observation.   11
attacker’s presence in the neighborhood.
15  However, even if local residents can avoid 
victimization, it is unclear to what degree this will mitigate sex offenses overall.  Prentky (1996) 
makes this point succinctly: 
“Although the immediate neighbors will be able to warn their children to stay 
away from an offender, there is nothing to prevent the offender from going to the 
adjacent community, or getting into his car and driving to an even more distant 
community. In other words, we will accomplish nothing more than changing the 
neighborhood in which the offender looks for victims. For those with a 
rudimentary appreciation of the forces that motivate repetitive sex offenders, it is 
all too obvious that notifying the neighbors will serve no purpose if the man is 
intent on finding a victim.”   
 
If offenders can easily target victims outside of their neighborhood who are unaware of their 
presence, then notification may change the relationships of offenders and victims but have a 
negligible impact on overall crime rates.  In other words, the response of criminals to notification 
may result in crime displacement, rather than crime reduction.
16     
  In addition to raising the cost of targeting local victims, there may also be a “community 
policing” effect of notification (Lieb (1996)) that increases the likelihood that an offender is 
apprehended if he attacks a local victim (e.g., by increasing vigilance and knowledge of an 
offender’s actions within the neighborhood).  Again, if the likelihood of punishment only rises 
for crimes against local victims, offenders may simply offend in other neighborhoods. 
  The ideas laid out above help us consider ways in which the effects of these laws can be 
identified and distinguished with aggregate crime statistics.  In particular, we can use the fact 
that the measurable effect that registration and notification laws have on registered sex offender 
behavior is likely to be proportional to the size of the registry, while any impact on other 
individuals should not be sensitive to registry size.  As a result, the effect of registration on crime 
via increased probability of punishment (due to improved police surveillance and apprehension) 
                                                 
15 Though no legislators disputed this claim, other neighbors claimed that local households, including her parents, 
did know that the house where Megan was killed contained a sex offender.  See Filler (2001). 
16 Crime displacement has been an important consideration in other empirical research on criminals’ responses to 
changes in their environments.  For example, Jacob et al. (2004) consider displacement of crime along a temporal 
dimension due to weather shocks, and Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) test for geographic crime displacement in 
their study of the effect of police on crime.  Iyengar (2007) makes a related argument that changes in the relative 
punishments for crimes under California’s “Three Strikes” Law caused a form of “displacement” (from less severe 
to more severe crimes) through reduced marginal deterrence. 
   12
should be small when relatively few offenders are registered, and should grow in proportion to 
the relative size of the registry.  The potential impact of registration on the punishment level (fi) 
for forward-looking, unregistered individuals, however, would not depend on the size of the 
registry.   
  Likewise, notification may raise the expected punishment (fi) for individuals other than 
registered sex offenders, and this would have a negative impact on aggregate crime, irrespective 
of the size of the sex offender registry.
17  Notification may also have several, offsetting effects on 
registered sex offenders: increasing the cost to targeting local victims (cij), increasing the 
probability of punishment for local crimes (pij), slightly increasing expected punishments (fi), and 
increasing offenders’ relative utility of crime commission (ui).  The combined effect on overall 
crime frequency is indeterminate, but is likely to grow with the size of the registry.  
  Our simple model and the discussion above give rise to the empirical specification we use 
in this paper.  To examine the crime frequency, we estimate a reduced form equation: 
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Cjt is a measure of crime frequency (e.g., offenses per 10,000 people) for reporting area j in time 
period t.
18  αj is a reporting area fixed effect to capture any persistent heterogeneity in crime 
across areas, γt is a time effect to capture secular changes in crime over time, and Xjt are time 
varying reporting area characteristics that are likely to impact crime.  The variables “Rgt” and 
“Ntt” are vectors of dummy variables indicating which states had a sex offender registry or a 
notification law in place during time period t, and “RgSizejt” is a vector measuring the size of the 
offender registries in area j in time period t.
19  Dj indicates the state of reporting area j.   
                                                 
17 This response may in turn affect aggregate offender-victim relationships if offenders’ probability of punishment is 
correlated with their relationship to victims.  For example, the reporting rate to police, and hence the probability of 
punishment, may be significantly lower for crimes committed against children within families (see Filler (2001)). 
18 Our analysis can be done at various levels of geographic and time aggregation, so we use the phrases “reporting 
area” and “time period” for generality here. 
19 We present a specification with a general notification law for simplicity.  In reality, there are different types of 
notification, including access to a paper registry, public internet access, and proactive community notification.  To 
the extent possible given our data, we explore variation in the impacts of these different types of laws.   13
 The  coefficient  β0 represents the impact of an offender registry on individuals other than 
RSOs.  If the registry increases expected punishment for unregistered individuals (due to future 
registration) then this coefficient would be negative.  A stronger prediction of our model, 
however, is that β2 should be negative – an increase in the probability of punishment for RSOs 
should lower crime by more when relatively larger numbers of offenders are registered. 
 Similarly,  β1 indicates the effect of a sex offender notification law on individuals other 
than RSOs.  We hypothesize that this coefficient should be negative, reflecting higher expected 
punishment for unregistered individuals from notification.  In contrast, we do not have a clear 
prediction for β3 due to notification’s offsetting effects on RSO behavior.  A finding that β3 is 
negative would indicate that notification reduces the availability of victims.  Such a finding 
would bolster claims made by proponents of notification, as protecting the public from 
recidivism was the law’s intended effect.  However, if offenders shift to more distant victims or 
commit more crime in response to an increase in the relative utility of crime commission then we 
could find an estimate for β3 close to zero or even positive.   
  We can also use the specification in Equation 2 to examine the impact of registration and 
notification on the relationship between victims and offenders.  If a sex offender law increases 
expected punishment for non-RSOs (β0 and β1), the effect should be similar across victims.  
However, the impact of the registry on RSOs should be greatest (β2 most negative) for offenses 
against “local” victims.  We would expect to find a much smaller negative effect with respect to 
distant relationship offenses (e.g., crimes against strangers) or, potentially, a positive effect if 
offenses are being displaced from local to distant victims.  How the effect of notification on RSO 
crimes (β3) should vary across victims is unclear.  If the increased cost of targeting local victims 
is a dominant effect, then a negative effect for local victims and a zero or positive effect for 
distant victims is likely.  However, if the increased relative utility of crime commission is the 
dominant effect, then we might see a positive effect across all victims.   
  When examining arrests and crime clearance, we use incident-level data to estimate a 
similar equation:   
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We add a subscript i to denote an incident within reporting area j, and use Ait to denote the 
outcome of interest.  The incident level variables (Xit) include all relevant factors known to 
police regarding the crime and reported in the NIBRS.  These include the characteristics of the 
victim, offender, and their relationship, the type of offense committed, the number of victims and 
offenders involved, etc.  Other variables follow notation from Equation 2.  
  When predicting the effect of registration and notification laws on arrests, both police and 
offender behavior become relevant.  A registry or a notification law should not influence the 
likelihood of arrest for individuals other than RSOs (δ0 and δ1) via changes in police behavior 
because police have no additional information on these individuals.  However, changes in 
criminal behavior may affect arrest statistics.  In Equation 1, if the punishment level (f) rises, 
then individuals offend less by substituting away from marginal victims where the probability of 
punishment (p) is relatively high.  Thus, we may see a negative effect of registries and 
notification laws on the likelihood of arrest (δ0 and δ1), but any effects should be of the same 
sign as any effects on the frequency of offenses (β0 and β1).  
  The predicted effect on arrests rates for crimes committed by RSOs is also unclear.  The 
direct effect of the registry (δ2) should be to increase arrest rates, reflecting increased monitoring 
and apprehension.  However, RSOs may respond by forgoing offenses committed against victims 
where the probability of arrest is high.  Therefore, the effect on arrests should be positive if there 
is no change in recidivism, but small if RSOs reduce offenses or shift towards another population 
of victims where the probability of punishment has not risen.   
A similar analysis applies to notification.  A direct effect (δ3) on RSOs via “community 
policing” should lead to an increase in arrest probability.  However, if local victims use 
notification to avoid RSOs and thereby increase targeting costs (c), offenders will only attack 
local victims with low probabilities of punishment, and average observed arrest rates will 
decrease.  The other potential effect of notification is an increase in offenses due to a rise in the 
relative utility of crime commission (u).  This would lead to increases in arrest probability, 
theoretically, as offenders victimize those for whom the probability of punishment was 
previously too great.  Thus, the impact of these policies on arrest probability must be interpreted 
in light of their impact on overall crime frequency.  Table 2 gives the predicted relationships   15
between the registration and notification variables in Equations 2 and 3 and the model 
parameters and outcomes of interest.
20   
 
4.  Data 
  The primary source of data we use in our analysis is the National Incident Based 
Reporting System (NIBRS).  NIBRS is a part of the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program 
(UCR), but presents several opportunities for research that are unavailable with standard UCR 
crime data.
 21  First and foremost, NIBRS links information on victims, offenders, and arrestees 
for each incident in the dataset.  Thus, in addition to examining the impact of registration and 
notification on reported crime frequency, which previous studies have sought to do using UCR 
data, we are able to examine effects on the relationship mix between offenders and victims (or 
the “incidence” of sex offenses) and on the ability of police to secure an arrest given that a crime 
has been reported.
22  In addition, the information on the timing of each incident is superior in the 
NIBRS data, allowing us to better exploit within-year variation in the timing of sex offender laws 
to identify our results.  While UCR data are available by month, the UCR date reflects when an 
incident was reported, not (necessarily) the month in which it occurred.  In contrast, the NIBRS 
reports the date on which an incident occurred.
23   
                                                 
20 Note that, in addition to arrests, we also examine clearance of crimes due to non-cooperation by victims or 
decisions by prosecutors not to pursue the case.  These variables are available in the NIBRS and are of interest to us, 
but victim cooperation and prosecutorial decisions are not part of our model and we leave discussion of these issues 
until we present results in Section 7. 
21 Like UCR, NIBRS identifies the agency reporting each incident.  Because agencies cover a relatively small area 
(i.e., a county or city) we can control for relevant fixed and time varying local characteristics.   
22 NIBRS also contains information on whether an arrestee resides within the boundaries of the agency reporting the 
crime, but the rate with which this variable is missing is high in some states and years and we do not include it in our 
analysis. 
23 If the date of occurrence is not known to the police (which occurs for about 20 percent of sex offenses) the NIBRS 
reports the date on which the crime was reported to the police.  Unfortunately, the NIBRS does not report both dates, 
so we cannot directly measure the lag between occurrence and report.  However, we can get a rough sense of the gap 
between incident and report dates by exploiting the fact that a subset of crimes reported in the NIBRS took place in a 
prior calendar year (i.e., some crimes that occurred in year T are reported in the data from year T+1).  We examine 
all sex offenses (excluding 2005) by the calendar month in which they took place and measure the fraction reported 
in the following year.  Of the sex offenses that took place in December, 11 percent were reported the year after, 
while the corresponding figures for November, July, and March were 7, 2 and 1 percent, respectively.  Thus, it is 
likely that most crimes are reported to the police within a few months after they take place but that a non-trivial 
fraction reported with a considerable lag.  In any case, our qualitative results are not sensitive to dropping crimes for 
which an incident date is unavailable.   16
  While several features of the NIBRS are useful for our analysis, it does suffer from 
significant limitations.  First, like most data on crime, NIBRS only contains information on 
incidents recorded by police.  Changes in reported crime may be driven by true changes in 
victimization or by changes in reporting by victims.
24  We return to this issue when interpreting 
our findings.  Another limitation is that the first year for which NIBRS data are available (from 
the ICPSR) is 1995—one year after the federal government required that states create sex 
offender registries and one year before it required the registry information to be public.  To 
address this problem, we requested additional data, available for some states, back to 1991 from 
the FBI, and have incorporated that data into our analysis below.
25  A further difficulty with 
NIBRS is that only a subset of states participates in the program.  In 1995, there were just nine 
states; by 1998, eight more states joined, and 30 states were included as of 2004.  Our analysis 
focuses on 15 states that were in the NIBRS by 1998:  Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, 
Utah, Vermont, and Virginia.
26  These states are geographically spread across the U.S. (see 
Figure 2), but they do not include any states from the far west (e.g., California) or the “deep” 
South (e.g., Mississippi). 
  In addition to the complexity of new states joining NIBRS during our sample period, the 
participation of law enforcement agencies can vary within a state.  Agencies are identified in 
NIBRS by an “Originating Agency Identifier” (ORI) code, and, within a state, the number of 
reporting ORIs increases over time.  For example, the number of reporting ORIs from Nebraska 
more than quintupled between 1998 (the first reporting year) and 2005.  We include ORI fixed 
effects in all of our regressions.  Thus, in addition to taking account of the growth in reporting 
agencies over time, we also control for persistent heterogeneity in ORI characteristics. 
  Another data issue is that, although the NIBRS surveys ORIs on a monthly basis, an ORI 
may not complete every report in a year.  We exert considerable effort to ensure that our results 
                                                 
24 This issue runs throughout most empirical research on crime.  There does exists a large, publicly available data set 
on crime as reported by victims—The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)—but it does not contain 
geographic identifiers that would allow us to link registration and notification laws to crime incidents.  Although we 
cannot examine reporting issues directly, it is encouraging that national crime rates reported in the NCVS have 
tracked UCR crime rates fairly well since the early 1990s. 
25 The results with this additional data generally confirm results generated using only the 1995-2005 ICPSR data. 
26 Tennessee and West Virginia also joined the NIBRS in 1998.  However, both had passed registration and 
notification laws by that time, and we therefore did not pursue collection of detailed legal data on these states.   17
are not driven by bad reporting.  First, we use the indicators provided in NIBRS for whether an 
ORI reported crime in a given month.  Among ORIs reporting crime during any month of each 
year, the fraction reporting for all twelve months ranged from 68 percent in 1995 to 89 percent in 
2004.  We limit our analysis to crimes that took place during months when the ORI reported 
crime in the previous month, the current month, and the next four months.  This restriction 
causes us to drop less than 5 percent of sex offenses that occurred between February 1991 and 
August 2005, and all offenses occurring outside this period. 
Despite this initial cleaning of the data, we found a number of instances of apparent 
underreporting of crimes in NIBRS.
27  We also observe agencies that, according to the NIBRS 
indicators, started reporting officially on a given month, but do not start reporting crime until 
several months later.  To address these concerns, we implement an algorithm to identify these 
kinds of misreporting.  First, we take all agency-period cells with a given number of crimes 
reported, then we calculate the variance of the number of crimes reported in periods a given 
length of time from the current period, and then we flag all observations that are outliers given 
this variance (i.e., the observation has very small chance of occurring, assuming reports are 
normally distributed with given variance).
28  We also flag all adjacent months, to guard against 
the possibility that underreporting in one month leads to over-reporting in others. 
Multiple offenses can be reported in a single incident, and we classify an incident as a sex 
offense if any of the reported offenses fell under one of three sex offense categories: rape and 
sexual assault, sexual molestation (called “forcible fondling” in NIBRS), and other non-violent 
sex offenses (i.e., “incest” and “statutory rape”).
29  An additional complication is the non-trivial 
number of sex offenses with multiple victims (8 percent) or multiple offenders (8 percent).  The 
                                                 
27 For example, an agency might report about 500 crimes every month for many months, then report few or no 
crimes for one month, and then return to the previous pattern of 500 crimes. 
28 We repeat this process for reports up to six periods away and flag observations twice: first with 1 in one million 
chances and second with 1 in one hundred thousand chances.  The two-stage process is helpful because it allows us 
to recalculate the variance after eliminating very distant outliers. 
29 Incidents of other crimes are used in our analysis to control for other time varying factors that cause changes in 
crime rates within an ORI over time.  We classify other crimes as either ordinary assault or “other” crime, in order to 
control for overall rates of crime and a type of violent crime arguably more similar to sex offenses.  We classify an 
incident as an assault if one of the offenses listed fell under an assault category but none of the offenses were a sex 
offense.  This latter condition affected only a small number of incidents: only 0.3 percent of incidents with a sex 
offense also had an assault and just 0.02 percent of assaults also had a sex offense.  Likewise, incidents of other 
crime do not contain either a sex offense or an ordinary assault.   18
indicators we create for the relationship between the offender and the victim include all victims’ 
relationships.  For example, if there were two victims, a family member and a friend of the 
offender, both the family member and friend indicators are set equal to one.
30  When we examine 
arrests, we include the characteristics of the victim and offender as control variables.  For 
incidents with multiple victims or multiple offenders we record the characteristics of the first 
victim and first offender listed.  These variables are only used in our analysis of arrests. 
Table 3 shows summary statistics on the sample of incidents we examine.  For purposes 
of comparison, we also include information on ordinary assaults.  In general, assault is a more 
common crime than sex offense in our data, with more than 14 assaults for every sex offense.  
Reporting of incident dates, arrest rates and time until arrest are quite different for the two types 
of crime.  The frequency with which incident dates are not reported (and only a report date is 
available) is higher for sex offenses (19 vs. 13 percent).  Arrests are less common for sex 
offenses (26 vs. 37 percent) and the time to arrest—conditional on the arrest occurring at least 
one day after the incident—is considerably longer (24 vs. 14 days). 
  The relationship between offenders and victims is similar for sex offenses and assaults, 
with family members and acquaintances as the two most common categories of offenders.  The 
overall fraction of (reported) incidents with an acquaintance is somewhat higher for sex offenses 
(31 vs. 24 percent) but incidents of sex offense are less common between family members (25 
vs. 29 percent) and significant others (8 vs. 18 percent).
31  For both sex offenses and ordinary 
assaults, in about 20 percent of incidents the victim claimed that the offender was a stranger or 
did not know his/her relationship to the offender.  
  Assaults and sex offenses differ substantially in the demographic characteristics of 
victims.  While 51 percent of sex offense victims were below age 15, the corresponding figure 
for assault is only 9 percent.  Sex offense victims are also more likely to be female (87 vs. 58 
percent) and white (78 vs. 68 percent).  Offender characteristics between the two crimes also 
differ.  The age distribution of sex offenders is wider than for assault, with more mass in both the 
                                                 
30 The decision to code relationships in this way, as opposed to using only the relationship of the “closest” offender, 
had no appreciable effect on our results. 
31 Recall that a small portion of incidents have multiple offenders and/or victims, and we code all relationships 
existing for each incident, so that these percentages can sum to greater than one.   19
youngest and oldest age groups.  Reported sex offenders are much more likely to be male (96 vs. 
77 percent) and somewhat more likely to be white (69 vs. 62 percent). 
  In addition to the information on victims, offenders, and arrestees from NIBRS, we 
employ annual, county-level demographic data from the U.S. census on the fraction of the 
population in 18 age categories and five ethnicities as well as annual county-level data on 
income per capita, employment rates, and unemployment rates as controls in our regressions. 
While some ORIs are smaller than counties, we believe these are the best annual data available 
to control for any demographic shifts that may have occurred in ORIs over our sample period.  
Two percent of ORIs are located in multiple counties.  We assign to these ORIs a weighted 
average of county characteristics based on the population of the ORI in each county.  
  Next, we use our legal research to classify each incident based on the laws in effect and 
the number of offenders on the offender registry at the time of the incident.  We mark each 
incident with a set of dummy variables for the state of the registration and notification provisions 
in effect in the state.
32  Marking each incident with a value for the number of offenders on the 
registry at the time of the incident is more difficult.  Unfortunately, historical data on the size of 
registries across states is very hard to find, particularly for the early years of registries’ existence.  
We were able to find incomplete information on the number of registered offenders in each state 
in governmental publications and elsewhere.
33  In addition, we know that a number of states did 
not apply their laws retroactively, and, for any such state, we are able to include a zero at the 
start of the registry.  This allows us to make some progress in determining the historical size of 
the registries for the NIBRS states at the state level.  In addition, we have a fairly comprehensive 
data set on registered offenders nationwide as of August, 2007.  This data set was compiled by a 
private company (www.familywatchdog.com) that provides sex offender information to the 
                                                 
32 For example, an incident that occurred on July 1, 1995 in Michigan would have a registration law enacted, but no 
registration or notification laws in effect at the time, while another incident occurring on July 1, 1999 in Michigan 
would have registration, public access, and internet access in effect. 
33 Two reports from the National Institute of Justice provide us with states’ registry sizes at the end of 1998 and 
2001 (Bureau of Justice Statistics (2002)).  In addition, we have been able to gather documents posted on-line by the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children that provide counts of offenders registered in each state at 
several points in time from 2003 through 2007.  The exact dates when the information was gathered varied by state, 
but, in general, this gives us a snapshot of registry sizes in 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007.  We also add additional data 
points from news articles and government reports for specific states.  It is our hope to be able to uncover more data 
and improve our estimates of registry size in a future revision.   20
public, and was given to us for the purposes of research.  From this data we calculate the number 
of registered sex offenders by county within each NIBRS state. 
  In order to use these two sources of information in our analysis, we first run a least 
squares regression of registry size on quadratic function of date, allowing for state specific 
intercepts and slopes and using all data points available for each state.  We then use the predicted 
values from this regression as measures of the state registry size for each month.  The results of 
these regressions are depicted in Figure 3.
34  We then allocate sex offenders to each county under 
the assumption that the fraction of offenders by county today is reflective of the fractions by 
county in past years.   
  One concern with the use of registry size is the potential for “reverse causation” by 
changes in sex offense frequency.  Registry size is largely a function of how long the registry has 
been in existence, the degree to which the registration law applied retroactively to previously 
released offenders, the inclusion or exclusion of offenders convicted of less serious crimes, and 
overall compliance with the registration law.  However, it is also clearly influenced by the 
number of sex offenses committed in the past, since new offenders are added to the registry upon 
their release.  Fortunately, the lag with which new offenders are added to the registry is likely to 
be quite long.  For individuals sent to prison in 2002 whose first listed offense was Rape, Sexual 
                                                 
34 An alternative method for gauging the size of sex offender registries is to rely only on timing and retroactivity 
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where the size of the registry when incident i is committed on day t in state s (RgSizeist) is measured by the 
difference between the date of the incident and the date to which the registration law is retroactive (tretro).  This relies 
on the intuition that registries start very small in states which had non-retroactive laws but states with retroactive 
provisions will have larger registries, all else equal, from the start.  From this point, all registries should grow 
steadily over time as more offenders fall under the law’s requirements.  This measure of RgSize roughly 
approximates the number of “cohorts” of sex offenders required to register.  Although some offenders will 
eventually qualify to be removed from the registry, under federal law, violent offenders and offenders who commit 
crimes against minors (a large percentage of sex offenders) must register for a minimum of ten years, and in many 
states even non-violent offenders must register for a minimum of ten years and violent and repeat offenders must 
register for life.  In practice, this formulaic measure is somewhat similar to our empirical measure.  For example, 
both measures show that Michigan’s registry started small and grew steadily over time.  However, the legal formula 
predictions for some states diverge considerably from the empirical predictions.  In particular, states that instituted 
significant retroactivity clauses after their registry began (e.g., Connecticut, North Dakota, and Texas) did not see a 
sharp rise in the number of offenders registered, as the legal formula would imply.  Presumably, this is due to 
difficulty in registering sex offenders no longer on probation (and whose whereabouts may be unknown) in a short 
period of time.  Because of the divergence of the formulaic and empirical registry size estimates, we rely on the 
empirical predictions to avoid bias due to measurement error.     21
Assault, and Child Molestation, the median sentence length was 120, 72, and 68 months, 
respectively, and the fraction with a sentence of one year or less was 1.7, 2.5, and 1.8 percent, 
respectively.
35  Thus, only a very small amount of registry size growth is due to recent 
convictions, and any short-run change in the frequency of sex offenses driven by other factors is 
unlikely to be correlated with short-run changes in registry size. 
 
5.  Empirical Methodology 
  We estimate the effects of registration and notification laws using the regression 
specifications outlined in Section 3.  All regressions include ORI fixed effects, year and month 
fixed effects, and control for annual per-capita income, unemployment, and poverty rates and the 
fraction of the population in five ethnicity categories and five-year age categories at the county 
level.  In addition, for some specifications, we include the number of ordinary assaults and of 
other crimes committed per 10,000 persons as proxies for ORI-specific time-varying factors that 
influence crime rates and may be correlated with the legal variables.  Though we do not report 
the coefficients, both assault rates and “other crime” rates are always positively related to sex 
offenses and are highly statistically significant.
36   
  The registry indicator signifies that the state has an active offender registry, and registry 
size is measured using our empirical estimates, as explained in Section 4.  For notification, we 
have a number of potential measures because the details of these laws varied considerably by 
state.  Recall that there are three types of notification: public access, internet access, and 
community notification.  Within these categories, we focus on statutes that implied widely 
available or “full” access to sex offender information by the public. 
In particular, full public access refers below to a law in which access is not subject to the 
discretion of local authorities and where the public can inquire about local offenders in general, 
as opposed to making an inquiry regarding a specific person.  Full internet access indicates that 
                                                 
35 Authors’ calculations using data from the National Corrections Reporting Program, 2002. 
36 One could argue that including assault and other crime may be problematic in that these may also be decreased or 
increased by sex offender laws, depending on their substitutability/complementary.  However, their inclusion turns 
out to have little influence on our results and, if anything, decreases the size of our estimated coefficients.  We 
therefore view them as appropriate controls for time-varying unobservable factors.   22
the internet registry is on-line and generally complete.
37  Full community notification means a 
law that makes notification mandatory and requires either neighbors or the media be provided 
with sex offender information.  Figure 1b shows the timing of the full versions of community 
notification laws.  In our regressions below, we define having a notification law to mean that at 
least one of these “full” versions of notification is in place and effective.
38  
Two important issues regarding statistical inference in our analysis are that our sample 
includes a small number of states and that our registry size variable is estimated from a first stage 
regression.  As noted by Donald and Lang (2007) and Cameron et al. (2007), clustering at the 
group level (i.e., states in our sample) can lead to biased standard errors when the number of 
groups is small.  In addition, using regression estimates as independent variables will also 
typically lead to underestimated standard errors (Murphy and Topel (1985)).   
We use a bootstrap procedure to correct our standard errors for both of these problems. 
Specifically, we repeat each regression in our analysis 100 times and calculate our standard 
errors using the variance of the resulting estimates.
39  Let βi be the estimated vector of 
coefficients from repetition i.  Our variance estimate is 
2
* ˆ β σ , where 







* β β σ
β  , N = 100 
  In addition to sampling our states (with replacement) in each repetition, we take account 
of any additional bias due to estimated regressors by using values for registry size calculated 
                                                 
37 We located news articles in six states suggesting that the internet registry was incomplete when launched, i.e., it 
was missing information on a large share of registered offenders.  For two of these states, we found notice of when 
the web registry was completed.  For the four states where we have an indication of incompleteness but do not have 
any notice of completion, we consider the internet to be fully available three months after the site was launched. 
38 Given the limited number of states and the fact that notification laws are designed to work in a similar fashion – 
lowering information costs and increasing dissemination – our primary specification uses any full notification law in 
effect.  One complication that arises from this framework is that two states in our sample (Texas and Ohio) had 
registration and notification laws in place prior to the start of the NIBRS data period.  Thus, variation in crime 
frequency within these states does not contribute to the identification of the main effects of these laws.  Dropping 
these states from our sample has very little impact on our results, and we report replications of our main results with 
a restricted 13 state sample in Appendix Table 2. 
39 In the simulations carried out by Cameron et al. (2007), this technique, which they term “paired bootstrap-se,” 
does not perform as well as other techniques, such as “wild bootstrap,” in the sense that it finds a placebo to have a 
statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable at the 0.05 level in around 10 percent of their 
simulations.  However, it is not clear from their work whether this difference is reflective of a general result that 
would apply to our situation, i.e., an unbalanced panel with groups of differing size and independent variables that 
have different variance across groups.  We find the standard errors from a wild bootstrap are smaller than those from 
the paired bootstrap, and we therefore use the paired bootstrap estimates.   23
from randomly drawn values from the distribution of our estimator in the “first stage” where we 
estimate registry size.  Specifically, we take the estimator of the K parameters from the first stage  
( 0 γ ) and use the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix (V) to draw a new 
vector ( i γ ) where ). 1 , 0 ( . . . ~ , ] ... [ , 1 0
2
1
N d i i r r r R R V i K i = + = γ γ   We then use this vector of  
coefficients to re-estimate registry size for each regression.  
  The unit of observation in our analysis is an ORI-by-month cell, and the dependent 
variable is measured as annualized incidents per 10,000 persons covered by the ORI (i.e., we 
multiply monthly incident rates by 12, for ease of interpretation).
40  For the purposes of 
analyzing data aggregated to the ORI-month level, our legal variables reflect the law as of the 
15
th day of the calendar month, even though our legal variables can vary within months in the 
incident level data.  The regressions are weighted by ORI population coverage so that the 
coefficients reflect average changes in crime risk faced by a typical person covered by the 
NIBRS sample, and to take account of likely heteroskedasticity.
41 
 
6.  Crime Frequency and Relationship Mix Results 
  Our results for the overall frequency of sex offenses are shown in Table 4.  With respect 
to the consequences of sex offender registry laws, we find no evidence that registries deter first 
time sex offenders.  Specifically, the impact of an (empty) sex offender registry is estimated to 
be positive, but that estimate is not statistically significant. Importantly, however, we do find 
support for the claim that requiring registration reduces recidivism, presumably by increasing 
monitoring and the likelihood of punishment for potential recidivists.  The interaction of the 
                                                 
40 Studies of crime frequency often examine the natural log of crime as a dependent variable in regression analysis 
(see, e.g., Shao and Li (2007)).  This transformation is problematic in our case because we use monthly data from 
very disaggregate areas and therefore have many observations in which zero sex offenses occur.  However, for 
comparison purposes, we present results in a number of our tables where the dependent variable is the natural log of 
offenses plus one per 10,000 persons.  The results from these specifications are quite similar in sign and significance 
to our measure of crime per 10,000 persons, and we therefore do not discuss them.  The similarity of the results is 
not surprising, given that we weight our analysis by covered population, hence relying more on larger areas that are 
unlikely to have months without the occurrence of at least one sex offense. 
41 To illustrate the heteroskedasticity issue, suppose we have two ORIs, each with ten sex offenses per 10,000 
persons in a given month, but one ORI has 1000 persons and another has 100,000.  These two values correspond 
roughly to the 5
th and 95
th percentile of covered population among ORIs in our sample. The smaller ORI in this 
example had only one sex offense, and would drop to zero per 10,000 persons if there are no crimes the following 
month (which is quite likely to happen given sampling variation).  In contrast, the large ORI had 100 sex offenses 
during the month, and is much less likely to drop to zero per 10,000 due to sampling error.   24
registry indicator with the size of the registry is negative and statistically significant, as predicted 
by our simple model of criminal behavior.  The interaction estimate in column (2) of -0.10 
implies that each additional sex offender registered per 10,000 people reduces reported annual 
sex offenses per 10,000 by 0.10 crimes.  This is a substantial (1.1 percent) reduction and, if 
correct, would give support to the idea that placing information on offenders in the hands of local 
law enforcement helps reduce the frequency of sex offenses. 
  Notification laws also appear to affect the frequency of sex offenses.  The estimates in 
Table 4 suggest that notification makes a difference in criminal behavior, but not in the way that 
proponents of these laws intended.  The estimated effect of the existence of a law that requires 
community notification on the frequency of sex offenses is negative and statistically significant.  
The coefficient estimate in column (2) suggests that community notification laws reduce crime 
frequency by -1.07 crimes per 10,000 persons per year (about 11.6 percent) via a deterrent effect 
on individuals not currently registered as sex offenders.  However, the interaction of notification 
with registry size is positive and statistically significant.  This implies that any beneficial impact 
of registration (as discussed above) on recidivism by registered sex offenders is dampened by the 
use of notification.  This also suggests that the punitive aspects of notification laws may create 
perverse effects (as discussed in Section 3).  Our results indicate that a basic trade-off may apply 
in the sex offender notification context—while some first time offenders are deterred by 
notification sanctions, the imposition of those sanctions on convicted offenders ex post may 
make them more likely to recidivate.
42  We explore the reliability of the estimated coefficient on 
the notification-registry size interaction further in Section 7.  
  How should a legislature approach this trade-off?  For a simple back-of-the-envelope 
analysis, imagine a state that must decide 1) whether to enact a registration law, 2) whether to 
enact a notification law, and 3) how many offenders to cover with these laws.  Because we find 
no evidence that an empty registry has any effect on crime and a larger registry (absent 
                                                 
42 Another possible explanation for the increase in crime frequency associated with an increase in registry size is that 
either the state authorities or citizens become overwhelmed with the number of offenders as the registry size grows.  
This strikes us as unlikely.  First, with respect to the police, we continue to see a reduction in the number of offenses 
as the registry grows under a registration regime, suggesting that, although surely costly, police are not being 
overwhelmed to the point where an additional registrant actually reduces the overall effectiveness of the system.  
Second, notification regimes are primarily local.  Therefore, most of the increase in registry rolls amounts to an 
increase from zero registered offenders to two or three in a neighborhood or zip code.  Citizens are not expected to 
track thousands of offenders, and, indeed, notification systems are not designed to work that way.     25
notification) appears to reduce crime, our findings imply that a state should always employ a 
registry (the optimal size of the registry depends on the shape of the relationship between sex 
offense frequency and registry size).  On the other hand, our results also suggest that notification 
laws are only attractive when the size of the registry is relatively small.  We estimate that putting 
a notification law in place deters -1.07 yearly sex offenses per 10,000 people, but a notification 
law that covers 14.79 sex offenders per 10,000 people (the sample mean) leads to 1.3 additional 
recidivist sex offenses per 10,000 people. 
If a state is required (as it is under federal law) to use both registration and notification, 
the level of coverage turns out to be somewhat unimportant to the total number of crimes 
committed.  This is because the notification interaction coefficients are similar in magnitude to 
the registration interaction coefficients, and the differences are not statistically significant.  As a 
result, because the interaction effects are not different from each other, our data do not indicate 
that a larger registry – when combined with notification – reduces crime.   
Given the significant costs of maintaining a large registry (both to the state and to those 
required to register), one possible implication of these estimates is that states should consider a 
narrow notification regime, in which all or most sex offenders are required to register, but only a 
small subset of those offenders are subject to community notification.  Alternatively, states might 
consider notification substitutes capable of similar deterrence gains, but that avoid notification-
related increases in recidivism.  Because notification laws were enacted not to deter, but to 
protect against recidivism, our results suggest a reevaluation of notification may be needed.  
  Table 5 presents estimates from regressions in which we disaggregate our previously 
singular notification measure into three different types of notification regimes – full public 
access, full internet access, and full active notification.  As one would expect, disaggregating 
results in less precision, and yet the basic pattern remains.  Again, we find statistically significant 
evidence that registration laws reduce recidivism.  The coefficients on all three types of 
notification laws and their interactions with registry size are the same sign—negative main 
effect, positive interaction—and the standard errors are too large to reject the hypothesis that 
they are equal to each other.  Nevertheless, we find it interesting that the coefficient on the main 
effect of active community notification is noticeably larger in magnitude, implying greater 
deterrence of first-time offenders.  The strength of the active notification result makes sense in   26
the context of our model, as active notification may be perceived as the most intrusive form of 
notification and therefore may have particular deterrence value. 
  In Table 6, we investigate the extent to which registration and notification laws may have 
affected the relationship mix of offenders and victims.  To carry out this exercise, we divide 
victims into three groups based on the intimacy of their relationship with the offender: “close,” 
“near,” and “stranger.”  The close group includes family members, significant others, and 
friends; the near group includes neighbors, acquaintances, or offenders “otherwise known,” and 
the stranger group includes incidents where the victim claimed the offender was a stranger or 
where the offender-victim relationship was unknown to the victim.
43  Again, in theory, 
notification laws are designed specifically to protect individuals who know offenders or come 
into contact with them in their local area by helping these potential targets avoid situations in 
which they or their friends and relatives could be victimized.  Accordingly, we examine whether 
(as lawmakers hoped) the frequency of victims who were close or near to the offender drops, and 
whether (as lawmakers had not hoped) the frequency of “stranger” sex offenses increases due to 
crime displacement. 
  The results of this incidence analysis support the interpretation of the results in Table 4 
above.  According to our simple model (see Table 2), the deterrent effect of registration and 
notification laws (the main effects) should not alter the relationship mix of sex offenses because, 
by definition, first-time offenders are not currently registered (so neighbors, for example, cannot 
protect themselves).  The results in Table 6 are consistent with this prediction – notification has a 
deterrent effect that is, percentage-wise, similar in magnitude across relationship groups, 
although the estimate for strangers is not precisely estimated.  In any event, there is no evidence 
that the effect differs across groups, and, for all groups, the estimated coefficients on the 
indicator for having a registry are not statistically significant.   
However, as expected, and consistent with the hopes of policymakers and our prediction 
in Table 2, the interactions between the registration law indicator and the size of the registry are 
negative and of similar magnitude for both the close and near victim groups.  In contrast, the 
estimated interaction for the stranger group is slightly positive, and, though statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, fairly precisely estimated.  The effects in Table 6 for “close” and 
                                                 
43 Note this is distinct from instances in which the relationship variable is missing in NIBRS.   27
“near” victims are marginally significantly different from zero (p-values of 0.15 and 0.08, 
respectively).  These results line up well with the idea that the benefits of registration help reduce 
crime by local offenders against local victims.  The magnitude of the coefficient estimates 
implies that each additional registered sex offender per 10,000 persons reduces these group 
specific sex offense rates, in total, by 0.07 per 10,000 persons.  Our results do not support the 
notion that registration of sex offenders with local law enforcement reduces crimes committed 
against more distant individuals, but, perhaps more importantly, the estimated coefficient in 
column (4) does not suggest a significant increase in sex offenses against strangers due to 
displacement, as some critics of these laws feared might happen. 
  Our model provides two possible predictions for the effect of the interaction between the 
notification law indicator and the size of the registry.  If notification laws make it more costly for 
a sex offender to target local victims (raising cij), then we should see negative effects on the 
frequency of sex offenses for near and close victims, but less of a reduction or even an increase 
(if there is displacement) for stranger victims.  On the other hand, if notification laws instead 
primarily reduce the relative utility of legal behavior for RSOs – by making life outside of prison 
significantly less attractive – we could see an increase in the frequency of crime as the registry 
size grows.  Furthermore, if notification laws do not alter the relative cost of attacking certain 
victims, the growth in crime should be similar across groups.  The estimated coefficients in 
Table 6 favor this last scenario.  The notification-registry size interaction is positive and 
statistically significant across all groups, and, as percentages, the increases are almost identical 
(with stranger crimes increasing by 0.82 percent, while crimes against close and near victims 
rose by 0.88 percent and 0.72 percent respectively).  These results shore up the claim that 
notification may serve as a crime deterrent against non-registered offenders, but may be less 
effective at reducing recidivism among offenders on the registry by allowing local victims to 
protect themselves.  Indeed, the evidence bolsters the plausibility of a relative utility effect, one 
that increases recidivism of registered sex offenders.   
The estimated effects of registration and notification laws on various arrest variables for 
all sex offenses are shown in Table 7.
44  Neither of the arrest variables shows a statistically 
                                                 
44 For analysis of arrests and clearance, we make several changes to our regression specification, as noted in Section 
3.  First, we examine incident level data instead of ORI-month aggregates. Second, we drop the controls for assaults 
and other crimes (which are aggregate statistics) and include incident specific variables in addition to the controls   28
significant relationship with either type of law.  If the decrease in crime frequencies associated 
with registration was indeed caused by increased probability of punishment, the response by 
offenders to this changed probability must undo (in equilibrium) any detectable change in arrest 
probability and in the time to arrest.  The notification coefficients show the same pattern.  A 
notification law may reduce the number of crimes, but does not appear to increase the probability 
of arrest.  The coefficient on the interaction of notification with registry size is also statistically 
insignificant.  The estimate is positive, as would be predicted by a change in crime due to a 
relative utility effect, but it is also very imprecisely estimated.   
With respect to dropped cases, we find little evidence that the probability a victim would 
not cooperate was associated with the registration and notification variables.  Looking at the 
probability that the prosecution decides not to prosecute someone for lack of evidence, we find 
suggestive evidence that this occurred more frequently in areas with a registry in place but few 
registered offenders, but less frequently as the number of registered offenders rose, at least until 
the advent of community notification.  One could certainly tell a story that would substantiate 
this type of result.  For example, prosecutions may suffer at the start of a registration regime as 
police personnel are used and criminal justice resources are spent on the construction and 
introduction of the registry, but as the number of registered offenders rises, police may have 
access to more and better information about local offenders, leading to stronger average cases.  
Later, with the arrival of notification, prosecutors may have found that the advantages of 
registration information to the state became degraded when community members also had this 
information, perhaps because of false accusations (to which we will return).  However, the 
evidence here is clearly not strong enough to say anything conclusive. 
At a minimum, our analysis provides some evidence to support the claims of those who 
argue that registration and notification laws matter.  Registration laws seem to reduce recidivism, 
and notification laws appear to deter those not currently registered.  Our work also suggests that 
notification laws may harden registered sex offenders, however, making them more likely to 
                                                                                                                                                             
mentioned earlier: victim and offender age indicators (in five-year categories), victim and offender sex and ethnicity 
indicators, indicators for the type of offender-victim relationship, indicators for the number of victims and the 
number of offenders (capped at four), and indicators for the type of sex offense (i.e., rape and sexual assault, sexual 
molestation, other non-violent sex offense).  The motivation for this added set of covariates is to control (as best we 
can) for the information available to law enforcement authorities and to examine law enforcement performance 
conditional on this information.     29
commit sex offenses, perhaps because legal behavior is significantly less attractive for registered 
sex offenders living under a notification regime.  
 
7.  Robustness Checks 
In this section, we address a number of possible concerns about the results presented in 
Tables 4 through 6 and our interpretation of those findings.  We first inquire into the possibility 
that our results are driven by some omitted variable or trend by checking whether our 
identification approach generates similar results for non-sex related crimes.  We also discuss the 
robustness of our specification and sample choice.  Second, we consider whether the results we 
find, especially with respect to the “relative utility effect” might be driven by changes in 
reporting behavior.  Although we cannot completely rule out the possibility of changes in 
reporting behavior, we present a number of findings that seem inconsistent with this explanation.  
  7.1. Falsification Tests and Specification Checks 
  One concern with our basic results is that there may be changes in crime frequency due to 
other unobservable factors correlated with registration and notification laws.  We control for a 
number of local economic and demographic variables and for contemporaneous crime, but the 
limits of our empirical strategy may still allow for omitted variables bias.  In order to increase 
our confidence that the results above are indeed indicative of the relation between sex offenses 
and registration and notification laws, we repeat our analysis on the overall frequency of other 
types of crime that we believe are far less likely to be impacted by the criminal behavior of sex 
offenders or individuals on the margin of committing a first sex offense.  We regard these 
estimates as “placebo tests” in which we would expect to find no statistically significant 
relationships between the laws and crime frequencies.
45   
                                                 
45 According to our model, the relative utility effect generated by notification might cause registered sex offenders to 
commit more crime in general.  In that sense, with respect to the interaction of notification laws and registry size, the 
coefficients in Table 8 should not be viewed as a falsification check in the usual sense.  However, we purposefully 
selected comparison crimes that we felt were very different from sex offenses to considerably reduce the likelihood 
that changes in the behavior of registered sex offenders would show up in overall crime frequencies.  Released sex 
offenders do commit many other types of crime besides sex offenses.  For example, among all sex offenders 
released in 16 states in 1994, subsequent arrests for auto theft occurred half as frequently as arrests for another sex 
offense (Authors’ Calculations, data from ICPSR 3335 “Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994”).  However, 
while released sex offenders are far more likely to be arrested for sexual offenses than other released criminals, they 
are considerably less likely to be arrested for the crimes we consider in Table 8.  Given that released sex offenders   30
  The crimes we selected for this purpose are auto theft, drug offenses, fraud, weapons 
violations, forgery, and larceny.  While our intuition is that these crimes are quite different from 
sex offenses, many of them occur with roughly similar frequency.  The results from these 
regressions are shown in Table 8 and are calculated using the same framework used to estimate 
the impact of these laws on sex offenses.  Of the 24 coefficients we estimate, we find only two 
statistically significant relationships between reported crime rates in these non-sex offense 
categories and our registration and notification variables (which might easily occur randomly). 
One of these estimates, for weapons crimes in column (1), does not “mimic” our basic results 
because that coefficient is on the indicator for whether a registry is effective.  Recall that, in 
Table 4, we found no evidence that the existence of a registry law alone had any effect on the 
frequency of sex offenses.  We also find a significant effect of registry size on the number of 
larceny crimes (column (6)), but, again, the result does not suggest our findings on sex offenses 
are spurious -- the larceny effect has the wrong sign.  More importantly, the signs and 
magnitudes of all of the coefficients increase our confidence that our earlier results are not driven 
by spurious correlation with general trends in crime.  For example, the coefficients on registry 
size are all positive or very close to zero in these specifications.  These results support the 
conclusion that the estimates in Table 4 are not driven by correlations between the registration 
and notification variables and omitted variables or trends in the data.  
  Another concern when dealing with relatively few states in a quasi-experimental setting 
like ours is that one large state might plausibly account for all of the relevant results (see Currie 
and MacLeod (2007)).  We check the robustness of our findings to this possibility by running a 
series of regressions in which one state is dropped from the sample.  We do not report the results 
of this exercise, but the coefficients generated remain remarkably robust to the exclusion of each 
state.  The point estimates change somewhat for different combinations, but the basic pattern of 
results and the statistical significance of the coefficients is unaffected. 
Our analysis controls for ORI effects, month and year effects, local economic and 
demographic characteristics, and for contemporaneous crime trends.  But, it is always possible 
that our approach attributes the consequences of some unknown trend to our registration and 
                                                                                                                                                             
constitute a relatively small portion of all released criminals, it seems likely that the portion of incidents committed 
by sex offenders in these “placebo” categories is very low.   31
notification variables.  Up to this point, we have not included state-specific trends in our analysis 
because one of our key variables – registry size – closely approximates a state trend (see Figure 
3).  Therefore, by including a state trend as a control variable, our empirical approach would 
essentially identify off of cross-county variation and non-linearities in registry growth, as 
described in Section 3.  This requires that we, in effect, throw away a great deal of information in 
an attempt to account for a possible, unknown state-level linear trend.  Nevertheless, it is a useful 
exercise, even though we view our earlier results as more reliable. 
In Table 9, we present our original results, along with a specification that includes state-
specific linear trends (in columns (3) and (6)).  Our basic results are fairly robust to the inclusion 
of the trends.  The magnitude of the direct notification effect drops, but remains marginally 
statistically significant (p-value of 0.15).
46  The coefficient on registry size is smaller but similar 
in magnitude relative to the other specifications and marginally significant (p-value of 0.12).  
The interaction of notification and registry size remains highly significant regardless of the 
specification.  The inclusion of linear state-specific trend controls thus changes the picture 
slightly, but, in most important respects, the basic results from Table 4 remain robust.  
  7.2. Reporting Behavior 
The coefficients we estimate provide, we believe, important evidence about the likely 
effects of two important and pervasive sex offender laws.  Across all specifications and samples, 
registration reduces the number of sex offenses, presumably by providing law enforcement with 
information on local sex offenders.  Notification appears to deter non-registered sex offenders by 
imposing an unpleasant shaming penalty, but seems to contribute to recidivism by reducing the 
attractiveness of legal behavior.   
There are, of course, other ways in which our findings can be interpreted.  We can only 
examine the frequency of reported crime, and it is therefore possible that our findings are 
affected by changes in victim reporting behavior.
47  For example, the sanction of notification 
                                                 
46 It is worth noting that the coefficient on notification is statistically significant at the 5% level when we restrict our 
sample to the 13 states that actually passed a notification statute during our sample period.  With the addition of 
state-specific linear trends as controls, it makes less sense to include the two states (Texas and Ohio) for which there 
is no legal variation in registration and full notification during our sample period. 
47 Data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (1996-2005) indicate that less than 50 percent of rape and 
sexual assault victimizations are reported to the police.  While reporting rates do not vary greatly by the age of 
victim in the NCVS, it is important to note that this survey does not include victims below age 12.   32
may reduce reporting by victims who have a personal relationship with the offender and consider 
the new punishment too harsh.  But this seems unlikely to be the entire story, given the effects 
we find for the “near” group of victims, which includes neighbors and acquaintances, and that 
we find a decrease in crime associated with registration alone.
48  Another possibility is that 
registration and notification laws may cause offenders to move away from family, friends, and 
acquaintances due to a “shaming” effect.  Thus, a decrease in crimes against these groups could 
be explained by their reduced contact with offenders.  However, it seems more likely, a priori, 
that this type of mechanical change in the relationship mix of reported offenses would be greater 
for community notification laws, since registration laws are likely to involve little or no shaming.  
Moreover, it is important to recall that our results do not provide any evidence that notification 
decreases recidivism, only deterrence of unregistered offenders.  Finally, another story one could 
tell whereby a community notification law decreases sex offenses regardless of the number of 
registered offenders is that the law increases awareness of sex offenses in general and makes all 
potential victims more cautious.  Unfortunately, we do not know of any data available that would 
allow us to test this hypothesis directly. 
  More importantly, our finding that the interaction of notification and registry size is 
associated with an increase in crime could be generated by two different plausible changes in 
reporting behavior.  First, as a registry grows and an increasing number of individuals are 
notified that a sex offender lives nearby, notification could lead to an increase in frivolous 
reporting of sex offenses, because the proximity of a sex offender is made known and salient.  
Second, the passage of notification laws and knowledge that a sex offender lives nearby might 
increase the number of true reports for crimes that, prior to the implementation of notification, 
would have gone undetected.  Both of these hypotheses are possible, but we find little evidence 
to support them in the data.   
If frivolous reports of sex offenses had increased, holding offender behavior constant, we 
would expect to see either a reduction in the likelihood that a report led to an arrest (because the 
average case reported has, all else equal, less merit) and/or an increase in the probability that a 
                                                 
48 Changes in reporting behavior might also lead us to underestimate the negative effects of registration of 
recidivism.  For example, if registration leads victims to believe that their reports are more likely to lead to an arrest, 
they might be more likely to report crimes.  We do not regard this story as likely.  While victims may know of a 
registry’s existence, they are probably unlikely to know whether their assailant is registered.  However, the 
estimated effect of simply having a registry, while positive, is never statistically significant.     33
case was dismissed by the prosecutor, because the average case became weaker.  In our analysis 
(Table 7) we found only mixed evidence: the estimated interaction of notification with registry 
size was positive for the prosecutorial dismissal rate but estimate for the arrest rate was exactly 
the same size.  Thus, it is hard to reconcile our results on the interaction of notification and 
registry size with a simple story about reporting bias. 
If shifts in reporting behavior affect different types of sex offenses differently, we can use 
that fact to test further the robustness of our results.  While registration and notification laws 
apply uniformly to rapists and child molesters, one might hypothesize that both types of 
reporting biases described above (frivolous reporting and meritorious reporting of previously 
undetected crime) are a concern primarily in the child molestation (fondling) context.  
Information that a sex offender lives nearby may cause parents to be more aware of their 
children’s’ behavior or whereabouts.  It may also lead parents to investigate their suspicions 
more than they otherwise would have done without that information.  But knowledge of the 
proximity of sex offender alone may be less likely, all else equal, to change reporting behavior 
substantially in the case of forcible rape. 
In Table 10, we divide our sample into three sex offense groups: sex offenses 
(reproduced from Table 4), forced fondling, and forcible rape.  Rape and forced fondling 
constitute the bulk of all sex offenses (see Table 3).  If either form of increased reporting were 
driving the recidivism findings, we would expect to see the notification-registry size interaction 
effect only in forced fondling cases, or at least primarily in those cases.  But, we actually see 
almost identical point estimates (both statistically significant) for both types of sex offenses.  The 
notification-registry interaction effect (in percentage terms) is somewhat higher for fondling than 
it is for rape, but that difference is small.  These results do not support the idea that our findings 
are driven primarily by changes in reporting behavior. 
 
8.  Conclusion   
  Using detailed data on state laws and incident-level crime data from NIBRS, we 
examined the effect of registration and notification laws on the total frequency of crime, the 
incidence of that crime on various victim groups, and on police performance, conditional on a 
crime occurring.  We find evidence suggesting that registration laws reduce the frequency of sex   34
offenses, particularly for local victims, by providing information on convicted sex offenders to 
local authorities.  Our results also suggest that the reduction in crime was locally concentrated, in 
line with policymakers’ intentions, with reductions generally greater among victims with a 
personal connection to offenders.  We did not find evidence of any crime displacement that 
would increase victimizations of strangers.  We also find evidence that notification laws reduce 
crime, but do so by deterring potential criminals, not necessarily recidivists.  In fact, our results 
suggest that registered offenders might be more likely to commit crime in a state that imposes a 
set of notification requirements, perhaps because of heavy social and financial costs associated 
with the public release of their information.   
  Though researchers are still in the process of measuring the benefits of registration and 
notification laws, the costs have been well documented.  A number of researchers have 
documented financial, physical, and psychological damage done to registered sex offenders and 
their families (e.g., Zevitz and Farkas (2000a), Tewksbury (2005), and Levenson and Cotter 
(2005)).  The labor and capital costs to law enforcement agencies who are required to monitor 
offenders can also be substantial (Zevitz and Farkas (2000b)).  Moreover, there is evidence that 
these laws have created financial and psychological costs for neighbors of registered sex 
offenders.  Linden and Rockoff (2006) and Pope (2006) document declines in property value for 
households living close to registered offenders, and several studies find little evidence that 
community notification alleviates concerns among community members who have been notified 
of an offender’s presence (Zevitz and Farkas (2000b), Beck and Travis (2004) (2006)).   
  The lack of empirical evidence on the benefits of registration and notification has not 
stopped politicians and policymakers from further regulation of sex offenders.  Registration and 
notification laws are, in some sense, old technology.  Today, states are in the midst of imposing 
ever more draconian laws, such as residency restrictions and civil commitment, as a means to 
reduce recidivism of sex offenders.  These more restrictive policies clearly impose higher costs 
on sex offenders and their families than registration and notification laws, and future research is 
needed to understand the impact of these policies on criminal behavior.    35
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Alabama 1967 5/26/1996 1998 No No
Alaska 8/10/1994 8/10/1994 1994 Yes Yes
Arizona 1951 6/1/1996 1996 No No
Arkansas 8/1/1987 8/1/1997 1997 No No
California 1944 1955 1996 No No
Colorado 7/1/1991 7/1/1991 1996 1998 No No
Connecticut 01/01/1995 10/1/1994 1998 1998 No No
Delaware 6/27/1994 6/27/1994 1994 Yes Yes
D.C. 6/1/2000 1999 No Yes
Florida 10/1/1993 10/1/1993 1997 Yes No
Georgia 7/1/1994 7/1/1996 1996 No No
Hawaii 6/14/1995 7/1/1997 1998 No No
Idaho 7/1/1993 7/1/1993 7/1/1993 1993 Yes Yes
Illinois 8/15/1986 1/1/1996 1996 No No
Indiana 7/1/1994 7/1/1994 1998 No No
Iowa 7/1/1995 7/1/1995 7/1/1995 1995 Yes Yes
Kansas 7/1/1993 7/1/1993 1994 No No
Kentucky 1/1/1995 7/15/1994 7/15/1994 1994 No Yes
Louisiana 6/18/1992 6/18/1992 1992 Yes Yes
Maine 7/13/1992 9/1/1996 1995 No No
Maryland 10/1/1995 10/1/1995 1995 Yes Yes
Massachusetts 10/1/1996 10/1/1996 1999 No No
Michigan 10/1/1995 10/1/1995 10/1/1995 1995 Yes Yes
Minnesota 7/1/1994 7/1/1991 1998 No No
Mississippi 8/1/1991 1994 1995 No No
Missouri 1/1/1995 7/1/1979 1995 No No
Montana 7/1/1989 1989 1995 No No
Nebraska 1/1/1997 7/1/1997 1/1/1997 1997 No Yes
Nevada 1961 1/1/1998 1998 No No
New Hampshire 1/1/1993 1993 1996 No No
New Jersey 10/31/1994 10/31/1994 1993 No No
New Mexico 7/1/1995 7/1/1995 1995 Yes Yes
New York 1/21/1996 1/21/1996 1995 No No
North Carolina 1/1/1996 1/1/1996 1996 Yes Yes
North Dakota 7/1/1993 8/1/1991 1991 1995 No No
Ohio 7/1/1997 1963 7/1/1997 1997 No No
Oklahoma 11/1/1989 11/1/1989 1998 No No
Oregon 1/1/1990 10/3/1989 1993 No No
Pennsylvania 4/21/1996 4/21/1996 1996 Yes Yes
Rhode Island 7/1/1992 1992 1996 No No
South Carolina 7/1/1994 7/1/1994 7/1/1994 1999 No No
South Dakota 7/1/1994 1994 1995 No No
Tennessee 1/1/1995 1/1/1995 1997 No No
Texas 9/1/1991 9/1/1991 9/1/1991 1999 No No
Utah 3/30/1983 5/19/1987 7/1/1984 1996 No No
Vermont 9/1/1996 9/1/1996 7/1/1996 1996 Yes Yes
Virginia 7/1/1994 7/1/1994 7/1/1994 1997 No No
Washington 6/7/1990 2/28/1990 1990 Yes Yes
West Virginia 7/10/1993 1993 1993 Yes Yes
Wisconsin 12/25/1993 6/1/1997 1997 No No
Wyoming 1/1/1995 1994 1999 No No
Agan (2007)
Table 1: Disagreement Among Researchers on "Registry Dates"













Model Parameters p↑ non-RSOs f↑ non-RSOs p↑ (local) RSOs
p↑/c↑ (local) RSOs 
u↑ RSOs 












c↑ Stronger Local Effects
u↑ No Differences
Probability of Arrest Same Sign as Frequency Same Sign as Frequency
Negative (But Moves to 
Zero as Frequency 
Declines or Crime 
Displaced)





Note: For details on how these predictions were made, see text of Section 3.
Variable of Interest
Table 2: Model Predictions for Registration and Notification CoefficientsSex Offenses Assaults
Total Number of Incidents in Sample 328,260 4,757,118
Rape and Sexual Assault 37.9% n/a
Sexual Molestation 41.8% n/a
Other Non-Violent Sex Offenses 20.3% n/a
Percent of Incidents with Report Date 18.9% 12.8%
Percent of Incidents Leading to Arrest 25.7% 37.3%
Average Days to Arrest 24.3 13.7
Prosecution Drops Charges 7.1% 4.8%
Victim Refuses to Cooperate 5.1% 6.6%
Offender-Victim Relationship
Family Member 25.0% 29.2%
Friend 7.0% 2.8%
Significant Other 8.0% 17.6%
Acquaintance 31.0% 23.7%
Neighbor 2.4% 1.8%
Otherwise Known 9.6% 9.3%
Stranger 8.4% 9.7%
Relationship Unknown 11.8% 10.2%





Aged 0-4 8.7% 0.7%
Aged 5-9 14.8% 1.6%
Aged 10-14 27.1% 6.9%
Aged 15-19 23.8% 15.3%
Aged 20-29 13.1% 30.2%
Aged 30-39 7.2% 24.0%
Aged 40-49 3.6% 14.5%
Aged 50-65 1.1% 5.6%





Aged 0-9 2.3% 0.5%
Aged 10-14 11.2% 6.2%
Aged 15-19 20.1% 15.9%
Aged 20-29 25.5% 31.3%
Aged 30-39 20.5% 25.4%
Aged 40-49 12.0% 14.5%
Aged 50-65 6.5% 5.1%
Aged 65+ 1.9% 0.9%
Notes: Sample includes all sex offenses and assaults reported in the 15 NIBRS states that we 
include in our analysis.  Relationships total to more than 100% in this table because some incidents 
involved more than one relationship.
Table 3: Summary Statistics on Reported Crime IncidentsSex Offenses  
per 10,000 








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Registry Effective 0.341 0.309 0.028 0.026
(0.436) (0.482) (0.032) (0.034)
[.45] [.54] [.39] [.46]
-0.083 -0.100 -0.006 -0.007
(0.034) (0.041) (0.002) (0.003)
[.03] [.03] [.03] [.03]
Notification -1.153 -1.069 -0.079 -0.075
(0.363) (0.367) (0.028) (0.027)
[.01] [.02] [.02] [.02]
0.084 0.088 0.006 0.006
(0.029) (0.032) (0.002) (0.002)
[.02] [.02] [.02] [.02]
Assault/Crime Controls 99
Mean Offense Frequency 9.17 9.17 9.17 9.17
Mean Registry Size 14.79 14.79 14.79 14.79
Observations 210,209 210,209 210,209 210,209
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.68 0.68
Notes: The dependent variable is annualized incidents per 10,000 persons in columns (1)-(2).  In 
columns (3)-(4), the dependent variable is the natural log of annualized incidents plus one per 10,000 
persons.  The unit of observation is a reporting agency (ORI) by month cell.  Registry size is measured 
in offenders per 10,000 persons (mean registry size is reported).  The notification laws represent "full" 
access by the public to information on offenders; for more details see the text in Section 5.  Registry size 
is empirically estimated from registry data, as explained in the text in Section 3.  All regressions control 
for county income and demographics, ORI fixed effects, year fixed effects, and month fixed effects.  
Columns, as indicated, also control for rates of assault and other crime.  Regressions are weighted by 
the covered population in each ORI.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated via bootsrapping.  P-
values shown in backets.
Registry Effective *                 
Registry Size
Notification *                          
Registry Size 
Table 4: Effects of Registration and Notification on Sex Offense FrequencySex Offenses   
per 10,000 
Sex Offenses   
per 10,000 
ln (Sex Offenses 
per 10,000)
ln (Sex Offenses 
per 10,000)
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Registry Effective 0.236 0.179 0.014 0.011
(0.402) (0.42) (0.026) (0.027)
[.57] [.68] [.59] [.68]
-0.099 -0.121 -0.007 -0.008
(0.033) (0.037) (0.002) (0.002)
[.01] [.01] [.01] [.01]
Public Access -0.423 -0.301 -0.039 -0.032
(0.442) (0.376) (0.036) (0.032)
[.36] [.44] [.31] [.35]
0.046 0.059 0.004 0.005
(0.029) (0.031) (0.002) (0.002)
[.15] [.08] [.09] [.05]
Internet -0.274 -0.201 0.002 0.006
(0.222) (0.234) (0.02) (0.021)
[.24] [.41] [.94] [.79]
0.036 0.035 0.001 0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001)
[.02] [.03] [.28] [.31]
Active Notification -1.896 -1.541 -0.139 -0.120
(0.775) (0.601) (0.064) (0.052)
[.03] [.03] [.05] [.04]
0.069 0.047 0.004 0.003
(0.075) (0.069) (0.006) (0.005)
[.38] [.51] [.46] [.57]
Assault/Crime Controls 99
Mean Offense Frequency 9.17 9.17 9.17 9.17
Mean Registry Size 14.79 14.79 14.79 14.79
Observations 210,209 210,209 210,209 210,209
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.68 0.68   
Table 5: Effects of Registration and Notification on Sex Offense Frequency
Notes: The dependent variable is annualized incidents per 10,000 persons in columns (1)-(2).  In columns (3)-
(4), the dependent variable is the natural log of annualized incidents plus one per 10,000 persons.  The unit of 
observation is a reporting agency (ORI) by month cell.  Registry size is measured in offenders per 10,000 
persons (mean registry size is reported).  The notification laws represent "full" access by the public to 
information on offenders; for more details see the text in Section 5.  Registry size is empirically estimated from 
registry data, as explained in the text in Section 3.  All regressions control for county income and demographics, 
ORI fixed effects, year fixed effects, and month fixed effects.  Columns, as indicated, also control for rates of 
assault and other crime.  Regressions are weighted by the covered population in each ORI. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are estimated via bootsrapping.  P-values shown in backets.
Registry Effective *      
Registry Size
Public Access *               
Registry Size 
Internet *                       
Registry Size 
Active Notification * 






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Registry Effective 0.309 0.032 0.162 -0.116
(0.482) (0.172) (0.212) (0.171)
[.54] [.86] [.46] [.51]
-0.100 -0.032 -0.034 0.004
(0.041) (0.021) (0.017) (0.01)
[.03] [.15] [.08] [.68]
Notification -1.069 -0.330 -0.315 -0.255
(0.367) (0.1) (0.163) (0.127)
[.02] [.01] [.08] [.07]
0.088 0.030 0.027 0.015
(0.032) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007)
[.02] [.05] [.08] [.06]
Mean Offense Frequency 9.17 3.41 3.78 1.83
Mean Registry Size 14.79 14.79 14.79 14.79
Observations 210,209 210,209 210,209 210,209
R-squared 0.36 0.20 0.21 0.29
Table 6: Effects of Registration and Notification on Sex Offense
Frequency and Relationship Mix
Registry Effective *                 
Registry Size
Notification *                           
Registry Size 
Note: The unit of measurement for the dependent variables is annualized incidents per 10,000 persons, and 
the unit of observation is a reporting agency (ORI) by month cell.  Registry size is measured in offenders 
per 10,000 persons.  The notification laws represent "full" access by the public to information on offenders; 
for more details see the text in Section 5.  Registry size is empirically estimated from registry data, as 
explained in the text in Section 3. The regressions control for rates of assault and other crime, county 
income and demographics, ORI fixed effects, year fixed effects, and month fixed effects, as described in the 
text.  In Columns 2 to 4, the assault and other crime variables are specific to incidents with the same 
offender-victim relationship as the dependent variable.  Regressions are weighted by the covered population 
in each ORI. Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated via bootsrapping.  P-values shown in backets.Arrest Made






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Registry Effective -0.001 -1.631 0.019 0.051
(0.038) (1.556) (0.013) (0.018)
[.97] [.32] [.16] [.02]
-0.001 0.024 -0.001 -0.004
(0.005) (0.111) (0.001) (0.002)
[.88] [.83] [.34] [.08]
Notification -0.015 0.440 -0.017 0.002
(0.038) (2.38) (0.014) (0.022)
[.70] [.86] [.26] [.93]
0.003 -0.047 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.112) (0.001) (0.002)
[.36] [.68] [.12] [.10]
Observations 287,789 65,702 287,789 287,789
R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.14
Notes: The unit of observation is a reported sex offense.  The dependent variables in columns (1), (3), and 
(4) are zero-one indicators, respectively,  for whether an arrest was made in connection with a report, for 
whether the report was cleared because the prosecution declined to pursue the case, and for whether it was 
cleared because the victim did not cooperate.  In column (2), the sample is restricted to reported sex 
offenses that lead to an arrest, and the dependent variable is the number of days from the report/occurrence 
of an incident until an arrest was made.  The regression includes controls for victim and offender 
characteristics, victim-offender relationship, type of sex offense, ORI fixed effects, year fixed effects, and 
month fixed effects, as described in the text.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated via 
bootstrapping.  P-values are given in brackets.
Registry Effective * 
Registry Size
Notification *            
Registry Size 
Table 7: Effects of Registration and Notification on Arrest OutcomesWeapons Forgery Fraud Auto Theft Drugs Larceny
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Registry Effective -1.790 -2.434 -2.293 1.263 -2.837 2.884
(0.739) (1.279) (1.81) (1.239) (1.945) (8.581)
[.04] [.09] [.23] [.33] [.18] [.74]
0.068 0.182 0.087 -0.100 0.349 1.393
(0.067) (0.141) (0.16) (0.099) (0.253) (0.627)
[.33] [.23] [.60] [.33] [.20] [.05]
Notification 0.565 2.165 0.778 0.219 -2.283 2.461
(0.741) (1.789) (1.458) (1.333) (2.031) (5.39)
[.46] [.25] [.61] [.87] [.29] [.66]
-0.060 -0.131 -0.083 0.030 0.080 -0.070
(0.058) (0.117) (0.123) (0.066) (0.164) (0.458)
[.33] [.29] [.51] [.65] [.63] [.88]
Mean Offense Frequency 6.58 12.32 16.06 29.58 41.91 241.41
Mean Registry Size 14.79 14.79 14.79 14.79 14.79 14.79
Observations 210,209 210,209 210,209 210,209 210,209 210,209
R-squared 0.39 0.52 0.54 0.80 0.60 0.86
Registry Effective * 
Registry Size
Notification *            
Registry Size 
Notes: The unit of measurement for the dependent variables is annualized incidents per 10,000 persons, and the unit 
of observation is a reporting agency (ORI) by month cell.  Registry size is measured in offenders per 10,000 
persons.  The notification laws represent "full" access by the public to information on offenders; for more details 
see the text in Section 5.  Registry size is empirically estimated from registry data, as explained in the text in 
Section 3.  The regressions control for county income and demographics, ORI fixed effects, year fixed effects, 
month fixed effects, and rates of assault and other crime.  Regressions are weighted by the covered population in 
each ORI.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated via bootsrapping.  P-values shown in backets.
Table 8: Falsification Tests: Effects of Registration and
Notification on the Frequency of Other CrimesSex 
Offenses    
per 10,000 
Sex 
Offenses    
per 10,000 
Sex 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Registry Effective 0.341 0.309 -0.185 0.028 0.026 -0.009
(0.436) (0.482) (0.289) (0.032) (0.034) (0.021)
[.45] [.54] [.54] [.39] [.46] [.68]
-0.083 -0.100 -0.061 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005
(0.034) (0.041) (0.036) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
[.03] [.03] [.12] [.03] [.03] [.05]
Notification -1.153 -1.069 -0.440 -0.079 -0.075 -0.025
(0.363) (0.367) (0.285) (0.028) (0.027) (0.024)
[.01] [.02] [.15] [.02] [.02] [.32]
0.084 0.088 0.056 0.006 0.006 0.004
(0.029) (0.032) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
[.02] [.02] [.02] [.02] [.02] [.02]
Assault/Crime Controls 99 99
State Linear Trends 99
Mean Offense Frequency 9.17 9.17 9.17 9.17 9.17 9.17
Mean Registry Size 14.79 14.79 14.79 14.79 14.79 14.79
Observations 210,209 210,209 210,209 210,209 210,209 210,209
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.68 0.68 0.68
Notes: The dependent variable is annualized incidents per 10,000 persons in columns (1)-(3).  In columns (4)-(6), the 
dependent variable is the natural log of annualized incidents plus one per 10,000 persons.  The unit of observation is a 
reporting agency (ORI) by month cell.  Registry size is measured in offenders per 10,000 persons (mean registry size is 
reported).  The notification laws represent "full" access by the public to information on offenders; for more details see the 
text in Section 5.  Registry size is empirically estimated from registry data, as explained in the text in Section 3.  All 
regressions control for county income and demographics, ORI fixed effects, year fixed effects, and month fixed effects.  
Columns, as indicated, also control for rates of assault and other crime and state-specific linear trends.  Regressions are 
weighted by the covered population in each ORI. Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated via bootsrapping.  P-
values shown in backets.
Registry Effective *           
Registry Size
Notification *                        
Registry Size 
Table 9: Robustness of Registration and Notification Effects
on Sex Offense FrequencySex 
Offenses   
per 10,000 
Sex 
Offenses   
per 10,000 
Fondling 
Offenses   
per 10,000 
Fondling 
Offenses   
per 10,000 
Rape 
Offenses   
per 10,000 
Rape 
Offenses   
per 10,000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Registry Effective 0.341 0.309 0.087 0.071 0.207 0.196
(0.436) (0.482) (0.227) (0.248) (0.206) (0.23)
[.45] [.54] [.71] [.78] [.34] [.41]
-0.083 -0.100 -0.051 -0.058 -0.022 -0.031
(0.034) (0.041) (0.022) (0.024) (0.017) (0.021)
[.03] [.03] [.04] [.04] [.23] [.17]
Notification -1.153 -1.069 -0.338 -0.300 -0.739 -0.700
(0.363) (0.367) (0.216) (0.213) (0.291) (0.303)
[.01] [.02] [.15] [.19] [.03] [.04]
0.084 0.088 0.042 0.044 0.043 0.046
(0.029) (0.032) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.02)
[.02] [.02] [.02] [.01] [.04] [.05]
Assault/Crime Controls 999
Mean Offense Frequency 9.17 9.17 3.85 3.85 4.71 4.71
Mean Registry Size 14.79 14.79 14.79 14.79 14.79 14.79
Observations 210,209 210,209 210,209 210,209 210,209 210,209
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.29
Notes: The dependent variable is annualized incidents per 10,000 persons in columns (1)-(3) and is the natural log 
of this value in columns (4)-(6).  The unit of observation is a reporting agency (ORI) by month cell.  Registry size is 
measured in offenders per 10,000 persons (mean registry size is reported).  The notification laws represent "full" 
access by the public to information on offenders; for more details see the text in Section 5.  Registry size is 
empirically estimated from registry data, as explained in the text in Section 3.  All regressions control for county 
income and demographics, ORI fixed effects, year fixed effects, and month fixed effects.  Columns, as indicated, 
also control for rates of assault and other crime and state-specific linear trends.  Regressions are weighted by the 
covered population in each ORI. Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated via bootsrapping.  P-values shown 
in backets.
Registry Effective *                 
Registry Size
Notification *                           
Registry Size 
Table 10: Effects of Registration and Notification on the Frequency
of Various Sex Offenses(1)         
reg-eff-date
(2)         
pubacc- eff  
(3)       
pubacc-disc
(4)       
pubacc-
mand
(5)      
pubacc-
writreq
(6)       
pubacc-
specific
(7)       
internet-live
(8)       
comm-eff-
date
(9)       
comm-disc
(10)       
comm-
mand
(11)       
comm- opt-
in
(12)       
comm-
victim
(13)       
comm-
neighbor
(14)       
comm-
media
Colorado 07/01/1991 06/05/1995 06/05/1995 
a 07/01/1999 N/A N/A 07/30/2001 12/01/1999 12/1/1999 
b 05/30/2006 N/A N/A 12/01/1999 N/A
Connecticut 01/01/1995 10/1/1998 
c N/A 10/1/1998
c N/A N/A 1/1/1999
c 10/01/1995 10/01/1995
 c N/A N/A N/A 10/01/1995
 c N/A
Idaho 07/01/1993 07/01/1993 N/A 07/01/1993 07/01/1993 
d
07/01/1993 
e 07/01/2001 07/01/2003 N/A 07/01/2003 N/A N/A N/A 07/01/2003
Iowa 07/01/1995 07/01/1995 N/A 07/01/1995 07/01/1995 070/1/1995 
e 03/16/2000 07/01/1998 07/01/1998 N/A N/A N/A 07/01/1998 N/A
Kentucky 01/01/1995 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 04/11/2000 01/01/1999 










Massachusetts 10/01/1996 10/01/1996 N/A 10/01/1996 10/01/1996 N/A 08/03/2004 09/10/1999 09/10/1999 N/A N/A N/A 09/10/1999 N/A
Michigan 10/01/1995 04/01/1997 N/A 04/01/1997 N/A N/A 02/01/1999 01/01/2007 N/A N/A 01/01/2007 N/A N/A N/A
Nebraska 01/01/1997 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 03/30/2000 07/15/1998 7/15/1998  
(lower risk)
7/15/1998    
(high risk)
N/A N/A 07/15/1998 07/15/1998
North Dakota 07/01/1993 08/01/1995 N/A 08/01/1995 N/A N/A 11/06/2001 08/01/1995 08/01/1995 
h 08/01/1997 N/A 08/01/2001 08/01/1995 N/A
Ohio 07/01/1997 07/01/1997 N/A 07/01/1997 N/A N/A 12/18/2003 07/01/1997 N/A 07/01/1997 07/01/1997  
(victims only)
07/01/1997    (if 
opt-in)
07/01/1997 N/A
South Carolina 07/01/1994 06/18/1996 N/A 06/18/1996 06/18/1996 06/18/1996 11/22/1999 06/18/1996 6/18/1996
 i 6/30/1999 
(newspapers)
N/A N/A 06/18/1996 06/30/1999
Texas 09/01/1991 09/01/1995 N/A 09/01/1995 09/01/1995 
j N/A 01/11/1999 09/01/1995 09/01/2005 
(newspapers) 09/01/1995 
k N/A N/A 09/01/1999 09/01/1995 
l
Utah 03/30/1983 04/29/1996 03/15/1996 
e  07/01/1998 03/15/1996
 e
03/15/1996 
e 07/01/1998 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Vermont 09/01/1996 05/29/2000 N/A 05/29/2000 N/A N/A 10/01/2004 09/01/1996 05/26/2006 N/A 09/01/1996 
(victim only)
09/01/1996     
(if opt-in)
05/26/2006 N/A
Virginia 07/01/1994 07/01/1998 N/A 07/01/1998 07/01/1998 07/01/1998 01/01/1999 07/01/2006 N/A N/A 07/01/2006 N/A N/A N/A
Notes: a: repealed 07/1/1999; b: repealed 05/30/2006; c: enjoined 05/17/2001 until 05/03/2003; d: repealed 07/01/2001; e: repealed 07/01/1998; f: repealed 04/11/2001, reeffective 07/12/2006; g: repealed 04/11/2001; h: repealed 08/01/1997; i: except for
newspapers as of 06/30/1999; j: repealed 09/01/1997; k: repealed 09/01/2005 for newspapers; l: discretionary after 09/01/2005. 
Columns (1)-(7): (1) the effective date of the first registration law; (2) the effective date of the first public access law of any kind; (3) the date that a discretionary public access law, if applicable, became effective; (4) the date that mandatory public access law, if 
applicable, became effective; (5) the date on which a "written request" requirement, if applicable, became effective;  (6) the date on which "specific person request only" restriction, if applicable, became effective; (7) the date on which public access was moved onto 
the internet, thereby removing all previous access restrictions.
Columns (8)-(14): (8) the effective date the first active community notification provision; (9) the date the notification law, if discretionary, became effective; (10) the date the notification law, if mandatory, became effective; (11) the date that a notification law that 
required that people "opt-in" to the notification system, if applicable, became effective; (12) the date that notification law that notified former victims, if applicable, became effective; (13) the date that a notification law that informed neighbors specifically, either by 
a written notice or by a personal visit, became effective, if applicable; (14) the date that a notification law that used the media to deliver any notification, if applicable, became effective.
Appendix Table 1: Evolution of Registration and Notification Laws, by StateSex Offenses  
per 10,000 








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Registry Effective 0.328 0.266 0.031 0.028
(0.414) (0.458) (0.031) (0.033)
[.45] [.57] [.34] [.43]
-0.075 -0.092 -0.006 -0.007
(0.036) (0.044) (0.002) (0.003)
[.06] [.06] [.04] [.03]
Notification -1.131 -1.065 -0.077 -0.073
(0.38) (0.36) (0.026) (0.025)
[.01] [.01] [.01] [.01]
0.086 0.090 0.006 0.006
(0.029) (0.031) (0.002) (0.002)
[.01] [.02] [.02] [.02]
Assault/Crime Controls 99
Mean Offense Frequency 9.20 9.20 9.20 9.20
Mean Registry Size 14.66 14.66 14.66 14.66
Observations 173,706 173,706 173,706 173,706
R-squared 0.30 0.31 0.61 0.62
Notes: The dependent variable is annualized incidents per 10,000 persons in columns (1)-(2).  In 
columns (3)-(4), the dependent variable is the natural log of annualized incidents plus one per 10,000 
persons.  The unit of observation is a reporting agency (ORI) by month cell.  Registry size is measured 
in offenders per 10,000 persons (mean registry size is reported).  The notification laws represent "full" 
access by the public to information on offenders; for more details see the text in Section 5.  Registry size 
is empirically estimated from registry data, as explained in the text in Section 3.  All regressions control 
for county income and demographics, ORI fixed effects, year fixed effects, and month fixed effects.  
Columns, as indicated, also control for rates of assault and other crime.  Regressions are weighted by 
the covered population in each ORI. Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated via bootsrapping.  P-
values shown in backets.
Registry Effective *                 
Registry Size
Notification *                          
Registry Size 
Appendix Table 2: Effects of Registration and Notification
on Sex Offense Frequency




















Registration Public Access Internet
Community Notification Year Joined NIBRS
 
Note: Depicted are dates when registration, public access, and community notification laws are effective, and when 
an internet site goes live. These include all laws, regardless of special restrictions.  Utah's registration law was 
effective in 1983.  For details see Appendix Table 1. 
 




















Registration Public Access Internet
Community Notification Year Joined NIBRS
 
Note: Depicted are dates when 'full' versions registration, public access, and community notification laws are 
effective, and when a complete internet registry site goes live.  Utah's registration law was effective in 1983.  For 









Note: Shaded states are those included in our analysis.  They include: Colorado, 
Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, North, 




Appendix Figure 1: North Carolina and Kentucky  










































































North Carolina Registry Size Kentucky Registry Size
 
Notes: This figure depicts the number of registered sex offenders in North Carolina and 
Kentucky at the end of each year following the start of these registries in January of 1996 
and 1995, respectively.  The North Carolina numbers are from reports available on the 
internet registry website and the Kentucky figures are taken from a report by Luallen 
(2004). Unlike North Carolina, offenders in Kentucky had to be both released and 
convicted after the law’s passage to be required to register. 